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Abstract
Vehicle coating is an important component of automotive manufacturing. The paint shop
constitutes the plurality of initial investment in an automotive assembly plant, consumes the
majority of energy used in the plant's operation, and generates significant waste from paint
overspray. The coating process also results in the emission of polluting volatile organic
compounds (VOCs). New paint technologies based upon powder coatings offer reductions in
VOC emissions along with potentially reduced energy usage and the ability to reuse paint
overspray. However, quantification of these advantages requires clear understanding of the life
cycle costs associated with each paint technology, modeled over the decades-long time horizons
within which a paint shop operates.
Life cycle cost models go beyond acquisition cost to consider all relevant cost drivers for a
given system. This includes obvious candidates such as investment and operating costs, but also
may include more subtle factors such as costs associated with variation, disruption, or flexibility,
hereafter referred to as hidden costs. In this thesis, methods for estimating these costs for a paint
shop are explored.
First, the development of a life cycle cost modeling tool, capable of quickly forecasting
investment and operating costs and testing the sensitivity of life cycle cost to changes in input
costs, is discussed. This tool is then used to compare the life cycle cost of three different primer
surfacer application technologies. Next, the potential impact of hidden costs on life cycle cost
for manufacturing systems are investigated, both through real-world examples and simulations.
Finally, this thesis explores the wider implications of a shift to life cycle cost analysis for
General Motors, in terms of both internal and external relationships for the Global Paint and
Polymers Center at General Motors, and identifies situations in which a focus on life cycle cost
can bolster managerial objectives.
Thesis Supervisors
John Carroll, Sloan School of Management
Frank Field, Engineering Systems Division
Randolph Kirchain, Engineering Systems Division
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Problem Statement
In the broadest sense, this thesis is about using cost projections as a guide for future
investments in manufacturing systems or new technologies. The specific goal of this project was
to provide the engineers at the Global Paint and Polymers Center (GPPC) at General Motors a
tool that would enable them to determine the life cycle cost of different automotive paint systems.
Life cycle cost is defined as the total cost of a system over the time of its deployment and
operation, and includes all relevant cost drivers. This tool was deemed important for GPPC
management because paint shops require capital-intensive long-term investments in the face of
great uncertainty -- in areas such as product volumes, future technology choices, government
regulations, product requirements, and energy costs.
The technical work outlined in this thesis proceeded along two fronts, described in Chapters
2 and 3 of this thesis. In Chapter 2, the development of this life cycle cost estimation tool is
documented, and an application to life cycle cost estimation of three different primer surfacer
technologies is presented. The development process for this tool began early in my internship
and continued throughout my time at General Motors. In this cost estimator, investment and
operating costs are projected over the life of a manufacturing system, and some built-in methods
of sensitivity analysis allow the user to test his or her assumptions. In this sense, this tool
captures the main technical goals of the project.
However, early on in my internship, we identified cost drivers that were not easily
categorized or quantified, but could account for a substantial portion of the actual cost of a
manufacturing system. These so-called hidden costs - variation, disruption, and flexibility -- are
discussed in Chapter 3. Rather than prescribe specific methods for evaluating these costs, which
are elusive, some general frameworks are laid out and specific real-world examples are provided.
While determination of hidden costs requires more research and extrapolation than investment or
operating costs, it is my hope that this thesis will impress upon the reader the importance of
thinking about these costs when making projections.
Finally, during the course of my internship, I naturally began to examine the link between
incentives and outcomes - specifically, how an individual organization's focus on certain classes
of cost (e.g. investment only, or investment and operating only) can lead to sub-optimal
decisions for the company as a whole. In Chapter 4, the relationships that define GPPC's place
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in General Motors are explored, and the implications of using the holistic life cycle cost
perspective advocated in this thesis are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
1.1 Automotive Industry Overview
One century after its inception, the automotive industry remains a dominant force in the
global economy. Worldwide, more than fifty million new automobiles were sold in 2006,1 with
revenues of the fifteen largest automakers alone comprising approximately 2% of the gross
world product. 2 Furthermore, the automotive industry is a key driver for a host of other large
industries, including raw materials suppliers (e.g. steel, aluminum), components, and oil
companies. While total car sales in the United States and Western Europe have stabilized in
recent years, strong growth in Asian, South American, and Middle Eastern markets has resulted
in approximately 2.7 % global sales growth over the past ten years.3 Finally, in terms of revenue,
automotive manufacturers represented four of the largest ten companies in the world in 2005.
Despite its vast scale and maturity, owing to both internal and external pressures, automotive
manufacturing cannot be described as stagnant. First, competition is fierce, particularly in North
America where a growing number of automakers struggle for market share and revenue growth
amidst a relatively flat market and rising domestic labor costs. In this competitive landscape, the
market has become significantly more fragmented as manufacturers seek differentiation and new
market niches. For example, in the United States, the top three automakers commanded a 59%
market share in 2005,, compared to 95% in 1955.5 Similarly, in 1955, six models accounted for
over 80% of sales,5 while in 2005 the six most popular models accounted for only 17% of sales.6
This increased fragmentation has also been accompanied by shorter times between model
Storey, J., The World's Car Manufacturers: A Strategic Review of Finance and Operations. Automotive World,
http://www.awresearcher.com, (2006), p. 1.
2 CIA World FactBook, https://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/xx.html (2007).
3 Storey, J., p. 1.
4 Edmunds.com, Edmunds. com Looks Back at 2005 and Forecasts 2006 Automotive Trends,
http://www.edmunds.com/help/about/press/108914/article.html (2006).
5 Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., and Roos, D., The Machine that Changed the World. New York, Harper Perennial
(1990), p. 43.
6 Edmunds.com, Top 10 Best-Selling Vehiclesfor 2005,
http://www.edmunds.com/reviews/list/top10/115851/article.html (2006).
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redesigns. Thus, in general, costly vehicle development programs have become more frequent,
with their costs amortized over smaller volumes. This has led manufacturers to focus on
developing flexible common vehicle platforms that can be used for several different vehicles,
often deployed in markets worldwide, and factories capable of building these different vehicles
at any given time.
External pressures, such as those exerted by regulations, have also dramatically impacted
automotive manufacturing. For example, the United States' Clean Air Act has changed the basic
nature of vehicle coating, and is thus of particular relevance to this work. In the past, coating
processes emitted large quantities of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that can react to form
ozone, a pollutant, upon release to the atmosphere. The Clean Air Act has forced vehicle
manufacturers to seek methods to curtail VOC emissions in their coating processes and caused a
shift in coating processes away from VOC-emitting solvents.
Finally, in general, additional external pressures will likely continue to shape the future of
automotive manufacturing, in both the near and far term. For example, rising commodity costs
may force manufacturers to alter the materials mix in their vehicles. Escalating energy costs and
geopolitical events will increase the industry's focus on energy efficient manufacturing and fuel
efficient vehicles, possibly to the point of replacing the current gasoline-driven powertrain. Also,
possible additional regulations regarding carbon emissions and fuel economy standards will
escalate these trends.
It is in this dynamic environment, characterized by pressures toward flexible and
environmentally friendly manufacturing processes, that this thesis considers the life cycle cost of
manufacturing systems, with a focus on vehicle coating systems. Life cycle cost models include
all possible costs over the life of the system of interest -- the system can be as simple as a single
robot or as complex as an entire factory. The goal of determining life cycle cost of
manufacturing systems is to make informed investment decisions that lead to the lowest overall
cost after all inputs and risks are considered, allowing the manufacturer to mitigate risk and
thrive in the face of the competitive pressures described above. Before considering these ideas in
more detail, it is first useful to consider the entire automotive manufacturing process and the
evolution of vehicle coating processes.
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1.2 The Automotive Manufacturing Process
In today's automotive landscape, vehicle manufacturing is an extremely complex process
involving many suppliers beyond the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Unlike the early
days of Ford's manufacturing, where Henry Ford sought to build a completely integrated plant at
his Rouge River "city-state,"7 no OEM aspires to directly control the entire value chain of
vehicle production. Rather, many vehicle systems are outsourced to suppliers, while OEMs tend
to focus on vehicle architectures, engines, and drivetrains. It is in the final assembly plant where
these systems are integrated into the finished product.
Final automotive assembly comprises three main processes: body, paint, and general assembly,
depicted in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1. The three major components of an automotive assembly plant.
In the body shop, the basic frame of the vehicle is fabricated. Originally, car bodies were
fabricated of wood, which precluded the use of elevated cure temperatures in the subsequent
coating process. This created a massive bottleneck, as car bodies were air-dried for up to forty
days before proceeding to general assembly.8 In the early twentieth century, Dodge was the first
manufacturer to switch to an all-steel body, enabling much faster vehicle coating processes.9
The all-steel body also helped enable the unitary architecture, dominant in cars today, where the
steel frame functions as both the chassis (frame) and body (external structure).' 0 After the body
shop, the vehicle is then sent to the paint shop, where coatings and sealers are applied to both
interior and exterior surfaces. These processes are outlined in detail below. Finally, in general
assembly, the coated body is mated with the interior systems, engine, drivetrain, suspension, and
wheels.
7 Halberstam, D. The Reckoning. New York, William Morrow and Company (1986), p. 87.
8 Andrews, D., Nieuwenhuis, P., and Ewing, P.D., "Black and Beyond - Colour and the Mass-Produced Motor Car,"
Optics & Laser Technology 38 (2006) 377.
9 Ibid.
' Ibid.
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Final assembly plants vary widely in the processes employed and capacities. In North
America and Europe, most vehicle assembly processes are highly automated, with the greatest
concentration of labor content in the final assembly steps. In countries with lower labor costs,
significant labor inputs may be utilized in other assembly areas. The relatively wide variety of
vehicles, both in terms of size and price, also generates variety in the assembly processes
employed. However, in general, as common vehicle architectures proliferate, more commonality
in processing will be employed. Also, assembly plants will tend toward higher flexibility to
maximize capacity utilization, so the investments in product development and manufacturing can
be amortized over a larger number of vehicles.
1.3 The Automotive Paint Process
Automotive coating is a complex, multistage process where vehicles are typically processed
in a serial fashion. The main details of the coating process are outlined in Table 1.1; process
times described below do not include vehicle inspection and routing times. The description
below follows that of Andrews et al."
Table 1.1. Outline of the automotive paint process.
Phosphate 30 Corrosion protection
ELPO Oven 30 Cure coating
Primer Surfacer 10 Restore surface smoothness
Basecoat 10 Provide vehicle color
Topcoat Oven 30 Cure basecoat and clearcoat layers
Vehicles enter the paint shop after body assembly, where the basic structure of the automobile
gets defined. Bodies are first cleaned and then coated in a thin layer of zinc phosphate, which
promotes adhesion of subsequent layers and provides corrosion protection. Next, vehicles are
17
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coated in an anti-corrosive polymer, commonly called E-coat or ELPO (electrodeposited
polymer). These first two coating steps are often done in large dip tanks, where the entire
vehicle is immersed in solution. Next, the ELPO coating is cured in an oven and vehicles are
inspected for defects. After defect repair, accomplished via sanding, sealer is applied along
seams and joints to provide additional corrosion protection and to weatherproof the vehicle.
Next, vehicles are given a layer of primer surfacer, which primarily serves to provide a smooth
surface for the subsequent paint layers. In some buried surfaces of the vehicle, such as under the
hood or trunk lid, primer surfacer (matched to the body color) may be the final layer applied.
After primer surfacer deposition, vehicles are baked in an oven to cure the paint and inspected
for defects. Next, the topcoat layers are deposited, comprising both a basecoat that imparts the
vehicle color and a clearcoat that protects the basecoat layer and improves the appearance of the
finish. Finally, the topcoat layers are cured, and the vehicle is given a final inspection.
The flow time of vehicles through a paint shop is typically on the order of three to eight hours,
and work-in-process inventory is typically a few hundred vehicles. Generally, the paint shop
represents the bottleneck in automotive assembly, primarily due to three factors. First, the curing
process, which occurs several times in the paint shop, is relatively slow. In this step, vehicles are
exposed to elevated temperatures (approximately 350'F) for approximately thirty minutes in
ovens that are hundreds of feet long. Secondly, coatings cannot be applied instantaneously, as
the coating speed has to be balanced with the desire to efficiently transfer a uniform coating to
the vehicle surface. For example, articulating robot arms or mobile fixtures apply primer
surfacer and topcoat through applicators designed to minimize overspray (i.e. paint that does not
reach the surface of the vehicle and is thus wasted) and yield a uniform and high quality surface.
Finally, the paint shop is extremely capital-intensive, and additional capacity does not come
without a cost. Of the three areas of final assembly, the paint shop represents the plurality of
initial capital investment and a large portion of annual operating costs, each of which can reach
hundreds of millions of dollars for a single plant. As a symptom of these reasons cited above,
Howard and Graves cite some additional telling figures regarding the extent of operational
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challenges in the paint shop: according to their figures, approximately 28% of vehicles are
reworked in this area, and 40% of work-in-process inventory is held in the paint shop.' 2
1.4 Significance of Automotive Coatings
Schoff' 3 has noted that coatings present several interesting paradoxes, many of which are
relevant to this work. For example, the coating process is both technologically sophisticated and
very simple, involving both robots with specialized electrostatic applicators and significant
manual inspection and defect repair. Additionally, coating processes are the subject of constant
research and development, but discovery is often by trial and error due to the inherent
complexity involved in the application of coatings over a variety of surface orientations. Finally,
coating processes provide significant benefits that easily justify their cost, and yet the paint shop
is under constant pressure to reduce its investment and operating costs. These paradoxes
highlight some of the challenges in vehicle coating and the significance of the coating process to
both customers and manufacturers.
For the customer, the coating process is of critical importance in terms of both initial
appearance and long-term quality, as coatings serve to both enhance vehicle appearance and
protect the body from corrosion. Paint is often the first vehicle attribute noticed by a customer,
and certain vehicle / color combinations have become iconic (to cite but a few examples,
Prince's song "Little Red Corvette," the Mary Kay pink Cadillac, the ever-popular Ferrari Red,
and the trademark light blue color of Ford's LeMans-winning GT40 in the 1960s).
Manufacturers thus place great importance on the appearance of their coatings. Interestingly,
however, the quantitative measurement techniques that link coating metrics to perceived quality
are still under development. Regarding long-term quality, the coating process has been
rigorously engineered to protect the (usually) steel body from rust for many years, to the point
where corrosion is a rarity in modem vehicles. In fact, the first two layers in vehicle coating
exist solely to prevent the body from rusting and are invisible to the customer in normal
circumstances.
12 Howard, M. and Graves, A., "Painting the 3Daycar: Developing a New Approach to Automotive Coatings and
Lean Manufacture," Society ofAutomotive Engineers Automotive and Transportation Technology Congress and
Exhibition (2001).
13 Schoff, C.K., "Organic Coatings: The Paradoxical Materials," Progress in Organic Coatings 52 (2005) 21.
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For the manufacturer, most of the energy used in the assembly process is consumed in the
paint shop, largely in the curing and paint distribution and collection systems. Coating materials
are also expensive, and yet paint overspray (the result of the inability to reuse the portion of
sprayed paint that does not reach the vehicle surface; overspray must then be collected and
disposed of) results in significant waste and disposal costs. Finally, the coating process results in
the emission of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), chemicals that contribute to the formation
of the pollutant ozone in the lower atmosphere. The United States Clean Air Act of 1977
requires automotive manufacturers to reduce their VOC emissions. These costs (both in
traditional cost and environmental externalities) have created enormous pressure on automotive
manufacturers to implement improved paint processes.
One relatively recent change in the coating process has been a shift in the types of materials
used in paints, from VOC-emitting solventborne paints toward either lower solvent
concentrations (achieved with higher percentages of solids and/or by replacing some portion of
solvents with water) or VOC-free powder paints. In the powder coating process, solid paint
particles are fluidized by compressed air, electrostatically charged, and directed at a grounded
substrate.' 4 The coated substrate is then baked to achieve cross-linking of the individual
particles and creation of a continuous film. Powder processes have two main advantages over
liquid processes. First, powder can be reclaimed and recycled, reducing material and disposal
costs. Second, powder does not require abatement systems to deal with this sludge, sharply
reducing water and energy usage and simplifying facility design. However, while powder
coatings offer great advantages, they cannot be universally employed. To date, powder coatings
cannot support metallic finishes, eliminating their use in the basecoat layer. Multicolor powder
processes can be deployed, but reuse of multicolor powder is more complicated and confined to
the initial application layer.'15' 6 Also, manufacturers have been slow to adopt powder coatings
for the clearcoat layer, as the visual quality of powder clearcoat layers is thought to degrade over
time. Finally, the effect of powder processes on life cycle cost has not been well-characterized,
14 Barberich, B., "Application of Color Powder Paint in the Automotive Industry." Master's Thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (2004), p. 12.
15 Ibid.
16 Johnson, J.C., Joyce, J.R., and Kolarik, W., "Multidimensional Design, Multicolor Powder Primer," Metal
Finishing 98 (2000) 10.
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as the ability to reuse paint is at least partially offset by the increased material costs, need for
specialized equipment to deliver and collect the powder, and increased compressed air usage
needed to maintain the fluid properties of the powder. For a detailed review of powder coating
process development and implications, the reader is directed to recent reviews by Nallicheri,' 7
DeWitt,' 8 and Beuerle.19
Finally, some additional recent developments beyond the continued deployment of powder
coatings help to demonstrate the automotive industry's intense focus on the economic and
environmental costs of the paint shop. For example, Ford has announced plans to use paint
emissions to generate electricity in one of their assembly plants. 20 Also, BMW is using methane
gas generated in a nearby landfill to power one of its paint shops in South Carolina.2 ' Finally,
several companies, among them PPG, DuPont, and Mazda, have announced two or three layer
"wet on wet" processes that eliminate one or more of the oven drying steps in the paint
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process. ' It is thus clear that the industry is committed to reducing the net economic and
environmental impact of the paint shop.
1.5 Key Players in Automotive Coatings
The automotive coating industry can be broadly divided into material and equipment
suppliers. Prominent material suppliers include BASF, DuPont, and PPG, while representative
equipment suppliers include ABB, Diirr, Eisenmann, Fanuc, Geico, Giffin, Sames, and Taiki-Sha.
In the following paragraphs, a brief overview of each of these suppliers and their respective
industries is provided. All financial data cited below was compiled using public financial reports.
17 Nallicheri, R.A., "Automotive Painting: An Economic and Strategic Analysis." Master's Thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (1993).
18 DeWitt, C.M., "A Holistic Approach to Automotive Powder Coating." Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (1995).
19 Beuerle, J.E., "A Study of Electrostatically Applied Powder Paint in the Automotive Industry," Master's Thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1996).
20 Migliore, P., "Ford Makes Electricity from Paint Fumes,"Automotive News, September 12, 2005.
2 1
"BMW to Operate World's First Green Paint Shop," Business Wire, May 5, 2006.
Truett, R., "Automakers Struggle to Wipe Out Paint Shops," Automotive News, August 7, 2006.
23 Yamane, T., et al., "Development of Eco-Friendly Coating Technology Paints and Coating System for Primer /
Top Coat Wet-on Coating," Review ofAutomotive Engineering 25 (2004) 1999.
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This is not meant to be an all-inclusive list; rather, the goal is to provide the reader with a sense
of the competitive landscape faced by suppliers to automotive paint shops.
Material Suppliers. The coating materials industry has experienced robust growth in recent
years, expanding at an average rate of over 5% in the past five years to a value of $70 Billion in
2005.24 Within this industry, approximately 40% of revenues are derived from automotive and
industrial coatings. The three companies cited above, DuPont, BASF, and PPG, provide a broad
range of coating materials to the automotive industry. Respectively, they are headquartered in
Delaware, Germany, and Pennsylvania. Both DuPont and BASF are diversified companies
serving a variety of market segments, such as chemicals, plastics, electronics, energy, health care,
and agriculture. Both companies have used acquisitions to drive their growth in the coatings
segment. In 2006, BASF's Coatings Division accounted for 4.4% of their C52.6 billion in
revenues. In contrast, approximately 22% of DuPont's $27.4 billion in revenues in 2006 came
from its Coatings & Color Technologies division. PPG is smaller and more specialized than
BASF or DuPont, with 57% of its $11 billion in revenues coming from coatings. All three
companies cite increasing raw material costs and decreased sales growth in the North American
automotive market as important risk factors, though strong growth in Asian automotive markets
has helped offset the latter.
Equipment Suppliers. In general, equipment suppliers are much smaller and less diversified
than material suppliers. ABB and Fanuc manufacture robotics and automation equipment, while
Dflrr, Eisenmann, Geico, Giffin, and Taiki-Sha are systems integrators, supplying entire paint
shop production lines or large systems within the paint shop. Finally, Sames supplies specialized
paint application equipment. ABB is the largest and most diversified company in this group,
with 2005 revenues of $22.4 billion. The company is headquartered (HQ) in Switzerland. ABB
has two main divisions, Power Technologies and Automation Technologies, with the latter
accounting for approximately 54% of revenue. They have the largest installed base of robotics in
the world and are currently the third largest in terms of annual sales with an approximate 20%
market share. In contrast, Fanuc (HQ: Japan) is a much smaller company, with its $3.3 billion in
revenues in 2006 derived entirely from automation and robotics. However, it is also the world
leader in robotics sales, with approximately a 25% market share. DUrr, Geico, and Giffin are
24 Data Monitor, Global Paints & Coatings Industry Profile, www.datamonitor.com (2005).
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much smaller companies that specialize in automotive systems; D frr (HQ: Germany) reported
sales of C1.36 billion while Geico (HQ: Italy) and Giffin (HQ: Canada) are privately held and do
not disclose sales figures. Next, Eisenmann and Taiki-Sha are also systems integrators, but more
diversified than Dirr, Geico, or Giffin; in addition to their respective automotive coating
businesses, Eisenmann (HQ: Germany) supplies equipment for a number of industrial processes
(e.g. ceramics processing, conveyors, lumber drying) while Taiki-Sha (HQ: Japan) also supplies
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to the semiconductor and biomedical
industries. Taiki-Sha reported 2006 revenues of approximately $1.7 billion, while the similarly
sized Eisenmann does not disclose sales figures. Finally, Sames, a subsidiary of Exel Industries
(HQ: France, privately held), manufactures electrostatic paint applicators and dust removal
equipment for paint shops. As would be expected, those equipment suppliers that primarily
serve the automotive industry, particularly in North America, have been adversely affected by
the recent struggles in this industry.
In Chapter 4, the nature of material and equipment supplier relationships is explored in further
detail. With this brief industry overview in place, we now turn to the task of conducting the
economic and environmental analysis necessary to choose a paint technology. The former is
addressed with life cycle cost analysis, while the latter is addressed with life cycle analysis. In
short, life cycle cost projections assess the economic impact of a manufacturing process while
life cycle analysis measures the externalities associated with that process.
1.6 Life Cycle Analysis
Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) is used to measure the net environmental impact of a process, in
terms of both energy usage and pollution generation. There have been several recent LCA
studies in the field of automotive manufacturing, some of which focus on automotive coatings.
First, Keoleian et al. calculated the total life cycle energy contributions for an average vehicle,
showing the vast majority of energy consumption (85%) occurs while the vehicle is in use.25 In
contrast, only 14% of total energy consumption occurs during raw materials production and
vehicle fabrication, and the remaining portion is consumed during end-of-life recycling. While
energy consumption during fabrication is low when compared to energy consumption in the use
25 Keoleian, G., et al., "LCI Modeling Challenges and Solutions for a Complex Product System: A Mid-Sized
Automobile," SAE Paper 982169, 1988.
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phase, it is still a significant cost driver for automotive manufacturing, particularly in the paint
shop. Furthermore, emissions of pollutants during raw material fabrication and automotive
manufacturing may be significant. Therefore, Pappasavva et al. compared the total
environmental impact of several different automotive coating technologies,26,27 examining either
powder or solventborne primer, waterborne basecoat, and powder or solventborne clearcoat.
These comparisons involved rating energy consumption during raw material fabrication and
atmospheric emissions (VOCs, CO, SO,, NO,, and particulates) during material production and
vehicle manufacturing. In general, the combination of a powder-based primer, waterborne
basecoat, and powder clearcoat were shown to have the least environmental impact of all options
considered, though each technical choice exhibited trade-offs. These trade-offs were also
identified by Dobson, who compared solventborne and waterborne basecoat processes.28
Dobson argues that solventborne basecoats, where the emissions are incinerated to destroy VOCs,
are environmentally superior to waterborne basecoats because of the reduced energy
consumption and increased transfer efficiency in solventborne processes.
The LCA studies described above highlight some challenges with this approach. First, as
shown by the possible conflict between Dobson's and Papasavva's studies, the environmental
accounting necessary to calculate emissions and energy consumption is quite complex and
cannot provide exact figures. Second, as discussed by Gaines and Stodolsky,29 there are no
standard methodologies for conducting these studies or interpreting their results. The ultimate
goal of LCA would be the ability to link a specific metric to a quantifiable environmental or
economic impact, and therefore present a unified framework for evaluating the environmental
costs of manufacturing processes. However, calculation of the cost of externalities is difficult
and controversial, though recent methods in use for SO, (and, more recently, C0 2) emissions
26 Papasavva, S., "Addressing Environmental Concerns in the Automotive Industry," Materials Research Society
Symposium Proceedings 895 (2006) 27.
2 Papasavva, S., et al., "Characterization of Automotive Paints: An Environmental Impact Analysis," Progress in
Organic Coatings 43 (2001) 193.
28 Dobson, I.D., "Life Cycle Assessment for Painting Processes: Putting the VOC Issue in Perspective," Progress in
Organic Coatings 27 (1996) 55.
29 Gaines, L., and Stodolsky, F., "Lifecycle Analysis for Automobiles: Uses and Limitations," Society ofAutomotive
Engineers International Congress & Exhibition (1997).
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may provide the way forward. Here, companies' emissions of these substances are capped (by
regulatory or legislative fiat), and companies can purchase or sell emissions credits on the free
market to enable them to, respectively, pay for emission or profit from emission control
measures.
1.7 Introduction to Cost Modeling
The use of cost analysis is widespread, as firms seek to measure the benefits or costs of
decisions they may have made - these methods are in fact the basis of finance and managerial
accounting. However, more powerful cost modeling techniques allow managers to link physical
attributes of products or processes to outputs (e.g. cost, gross margin) and assess the sensitivity
of these outputs to fluctuations in inputs (e.g. commodity prices, process time) to project the
impact of decisions before they are made. In essence, these cost models then link product and
process design to cost and profit. For example, Field and Kirchain have advanced process-based
cost modeling30 in which process conditions are linked to cost inputs via mathematical
representation of the underlying chemical and process physics. Simple variations on this
technique are often used in paint engineering; for example, the material cost incurred when
coating a vehicle with a liquid material can be linked to process parameters via the relation
below.
Liquid Material Cost = Unit Cost x Film Thickness x Surface AreaTransfer Efficiency x Solids Content
General Motors also has a wealth of detailed process information linking deposition conditions
to process quality, which can ultimately be linked to cost via rework or warranty costs. In
addition to engineering relations such as the equation given above, a full process-based cost
model could also include logical functions linking operational parameters to cost, such as overall
capacity to the number of separate assembly lines or shifts required to meet this capacity.
In a process-based costs model, sensitivity analysis can be limited to simple "what if?"
scenarios, but can also be extended to more complex Monte Carlo simulations. In this method,
one or more inputs are varied randomly according to statistical distributions defined by the user,
30 Kirchain, R., and Field, F, "Process Based Cost Modeling: Understanding the Economic Impact of Technical
Decisions," Encyclopedia ofMaterials Science & Engineering, Elsevier Science Pubs, Oxford, 2001.
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and the variation of output parameters is tracked over a large number of trials (usually in the
thousands). The implementation of Monte Carlo simulations in a spreadsheet program such as
Microsoft Excel is described in Appendix A.
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Chapter 2: Life Cycle Cost Estimator
In this chapter, the development of a tool to estimate life cycle costs is described. First, the
architecture of the tool is detailed, and this cost estimator is used to generate to a comparison of
different primer surfacer technologies. Finally, the limitations of this tool are described.
2.1 Motivation
The impetus for the development of this estimation tool arose from the need to compare
different coating application technologies. As described in the previous chapter, the paint shop is
a very large investment, usually thirty to fifty percent of the total plant cost. This investment is
typically expected to last for twenty to forty years, with significant upgrades in capital equipment
occurring every five to ten years. Additionally, operating costs are substantial; while the labor
costs in the paint shop are generally lower than in general assembly, the paint shop consumes the
vast majority of the total energy used in the plant's operation. Finally, once built, the paint
shop's processes and capacity are relatively "sticky;" that is, these decisions are difficult to alter
later. Regarding process alterations, conveyors are difficult to reroute, space is at a premium,
and the equipment is often very large and requires extensive facilities connections. Regarding
changes in capacity, while additional shifts can be added, the line speed cannot be increased
indefinitely without compromising quality. Thus, the initial choices made in the design of the
paint shop play a critical role in manufacturing costs for years to come.
2.2 Taxonomy of Manufacturing Costs
The first step undertaken in creating the life cycle cost estimation tool was simply to classify
various manufacturing costs. Figure 2.1 details the taxonomy of costs in an automotive assembly
plant.
27
(Body, Paint, General Assembly)
(Phosphate, ELPO, Sealer, Primer Surfacer, Topcoat)
(Investment, Operating, Variation, Disruption, Flexibility)
(Labor, Materials, Energy)
Figure 2.1. Taxonomy of manufacturing costs in an automotive assembly
plant, revealing the hierarchy of cost classification and examples of entries
along each level of the hierarchy. Items in bold are expanded in the level
below.
The plant is divided into three different areas: body, paint, and general assembly. Each area has
a number of different systems associated with it; the exact number depends on the level of
granularity required in the model. For example, the paint shop can be divided into the five
different systems shown in this figure, or further sub-divided as necessary (e.g. topcoat could be
divided into basecoat and clearcoat). Next, each system's costs can be placed into five specific
classes: investment, operating, variation, disruption, and flexibility. The investment class simply
represents the one-time costs associated with building or maintaining the plant, while operating
costs are incurred to run the plant over the years. While investment and operating costs are often
sub-divided into different categories, these two classes represent the most common means of
organizing cost projections. On the other hand, variation, disruption, and flexibility are not
usually explicitly considered. In this work, the following definitions for these three additional
cost classes are employed. The cost of variation is incurred when systems drift from their
specification, resulting in problems such as rework, warranty costs, or unsatisfied customers.
The cost of disruption comprises the costs associated with downtime in the plant. Finally,
flexibility can either be a cost or a benefit - an initial cost may be incurred to install flexible
manufacturing systems, and the benefits may be realized later.
Investment and operating costs can be represented simply as the product of the unit cost and
the number of units (e.g. labor rate x number of hours). However, variation, disruption, and
flexibility cannot be represented in so simple a fashion. Rather, they need to be considered on a
case-by-case basis, and may best be represented as cost differences between two or more
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scenarios. The reasons behind this decision and implications, and additional methods to analyze
these costs, will be outlined in Chapter 3.
Within this taxonomy, investment and operating costs were further decomposed into
categories. In the cost estimator, pre-defined investment categories include equipment,
installation, building space, and permits. Pre-defined operating categories include labor, material,
utility, maintenance, and housekeeping.
While this approach seems rather simple, this framework can be used to classify costs in any
area of automotive assembly. While more specific classification schemes could be useful for the
paint shop, they would sacrifice the flexibility of this tool.
2.3 Description of Life Cycle Cost Estimator
The life cycle cost estimator was created in Microsoft Excel using built-in Visual Basic
controls, enabling wide deployment throughout General Motors without requiring additional
software. In essence, the cost estimation tool is used to generate specific scenarios, which can
then be compared and rated using the tool described in Section 2.4. In the following section, the
menus and resulting output for a sample scenario are briefly described. Rather than take the
reader through the tedious process of documenting every detail of the cost estimator in this thesis,
Appendix B walks the reader through generation of a cost model for a hypothetical factory
system and presents some screenshots of the estimator at work. Also, the cost estimator was
used to compare three different primer surfacer technologies, and the output is discussed in
Section 2.5.
The estimator is a single file divided into five different worksheets. The first worksheet
presents detailed annual cost estimates based on user inputs. The second worksheet defines
depreciation schedules used for capital equipment. The third worksheet presents several tools for
sensitivity analysis. Finally, the fifth and sixth worksheets detail investment and operating costs.
The first step the user must undertake when defining a scenario is to define basic inputs,
which link unit costs to annual costs and net cash flows. These basic inputs include annual
volume (decomposed into jobs per hour and annual work hours), annual work days, discount rate,
tax rate, and time horizon.
Next, the user inputs line items, one at a time. Each line item is characterized by a unit cost,
number of units, frequency of occurrence, year of first use (for depreciation purposes) or
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occurrence (for operating costs), inflation rate (for recurring costs), and depreciation
classification. For example, an operating cost could be incurred during every hour of production
from year three onward, with a pre-defined annual inflation rate. In this model, annual costs are
assumed to perfectly track inflation; hence, inflation rates input by the user are nominal.
After each line item is entered, the user clicks a button to compile life cycle cost, which is a
multi-stage process. In the first step, each line item's cost is converted to an annual cost and
projected for each year. Table 2.1 summarizes the logic of each formula. The use of logical
statements and active formulas over hard-coded values ensures that life cycle cost can instantly
be updated during sensitivity analysis, greatly simplifying this task.
Table 2.1. Formulas used in cost estimator to link unit costs to annual cost in
year j.
One Time Once at x years If (x) then
annual cost = unit cost x number of units
If (j year of first occurrence) then
Recurring Every x hours annual cost = (unit cost x # units x annual production
hours I frequency) x (1 + inflation rate)
If (j2 year of first occurrence) then
Recurring Every x days annual cost = (unit cost x # units x 365 / frequency) x (1 +
inflation ratey
If (j year of first occurrence) and
If (remainder(current year + year of first
occurrence)/frequency = 0) then
Recurring Every x years
annual cost = (unit cost x # units) x (1 + inflation rate)
in words, if the frequency of occurrence indicates that the
cost is incurred in the current year
The formulas listed in Table 2.1 reveal that costs are annualized, an approximation that converts
all costs to an annual basis. When costs are incurred frequently within a single year, this
approximation is very accurate. However, when costs are incurred infrequently, this
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approximation can result in slight errors. For example, a $1.00 cost incurred every nine months
will be converted to an annual cost of $1.33 for all years of the model. In reality, the $1.00
would be charged once in year 1 (9 months), once in year 2 (18 months), once in year 3 (27
months), and twice in year 4 (36 and 45 months). In this case, if higher accuracy is desired, the
user can enter each instance as a separate line item charged to the appropriate year.
In the next portion of the life cycle cost calculation process, depreciation is calculated for
each line item, which is used later for tax accounting purposes. The formulas are preset to use
lookup functions to match the line item's row with the selected depreciation class on the
depreciation workbook. For a given line item, the logic of the formula is:
If (current year > year of first use or occurrence) then depreciation cost = unit cost x # units x
depreciation factor for current year (obtained by matching current year to year on depreciation table
and reading the depreciation factor at that year)
The logic governing depreciation cost did not allow for the combination of depreciation with
recurring costs, since a single compact statement governing the logic of this circumstance could
not be derived.
After annual costs and depreciation are calculated for each line item, net costs are calculated
for each year. Net costs are the annual costs after considering depreciation and taxes. Generally,
for a given year
Net Income = Revenue - Operating Costs - Depreciation
When project revenues are zero (e.g. when we are making factory investments),
Net Income = - Operating Costs - Depreciation
Then,
Tax = Net Income x Tax Rate = (- Operating Costs - Depreciation) x Tax Rate
Net Income After Taxes = Net Income - Tax
Net Income After Taxes = (Operating Costs + Depreciation) x Tax Rate - Operating Costs -
Depreciation
Net Cash Flow = Net Income After Taxes + Depreciation - Investment
Net Cash Flow = (Operating Costs + Depreciation) x Tax Rate - Operating Costs - Investment
In the cost model, Net Cost is defined as the negative of Net Cash Flow. Therefore,
Net Cost = Investment + Operating Costs - Tax Rate x (Operating Costs + Depreciation)
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After net costs are determined for each year, discounted net costs are then calculated. For a
cost i years from today,
Discounted Net Cost = (Net Cost) x (1 + Discount Rate)'
Finally, life cycle cost is then simply the sum of discounted net costs for each year of interest.
Life Cycle Cost = (Discounted Net Costs)
While life cycle cost represents a comprehensive projection of investment and operating
costs over the life of the project, a single cost estimate is a deceptive quantity given the
uncertainties inherent in the projection process. As a result, a series of sensitivity analysis tools
were developed within the life cycle cost estimator that allows the user to quickly provide
bounds for life cycle cost, rather than a single number.
The first of these sensitivity analysis tools allows the user to enter simple bounds for unit cost,
number of units, frequency of occurrence, year of first use or occurrence, or inflation rate. Any
number of inputs can be selected at one time. The resulting output is the resulting best case and
worst case life cycle cost, for each set of bounds taken individually and in aggregate. This tool
thus provides a quick check on the bounds of life cycle cost in the best and worst case.
The next component of sensitivity analysis allows the user to determine the leverage of
individual inputs. This enables quick ranking of life cycle cost sensitivity to variations in each
input. Input leverage is defined as the percent change in life cycle cost resulting from a one
percent change in unit cost (equivalently, the first derivative of life cycle cost with unit cost).
The resulting output is an ordered ranking of input leverage for each input providing guidance on
how changes in unit cost will affect the resulting life cycle cost. This component of sensitivity
analysis is important for two reasons: it provides insight into which costs are the main drivers of
life cycle cost and therefore which costs must be correctly estimated to provide accurate life
cycle cost projections.
Next, another tool allows the user to view the sensitivity of life cycle cost to variations in
annual volume, decomposed into jobs per hour and annual work hours. The user is prompted to
enter the range over which to vary these inputs, as a percentage of the nominal, and a graph is
automatically generated that plots life cycle cost over this range. This tool thus allows the user
to quickly see how changes in volume affect life cycle cost. As will be discussed in Section 3.3,
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production volume over the years can vary widely from the originally planned capacity, making
this an important component of sensitivity analysis.
Finally, the user can elect to do Monte Carlo analysis, enabling stochastic variation of the
unit cost, number of units, frequency of occurrence, year of first use or occurrence, or inflation
rate of any number of inputs. The user chooses the parameter to vary the statistical distribution
that defines the variation (uniform, triangular, or normal), and the parameters that characterize
the variation (respectively: minimum and maximum; minimum and maximum, with the peak
occurring at the nominal value; and mean and standard deviation). Random inputs are then
generated over a pre-set number of trials, and a histogram of life cycle cost is presented.
Taken together, these sensitivity analysis tools avoid the trap of false precision provided by
presenting a single life cycle cost.
2.4 Scenario Comparisons
A separate tool was created to compare different scenarios generated in the life cycle cost
estimator and rate them with financial metrics. In isolation, these metrics do not apply to an
investment, where only costs are occurred, but relative differences in investments enable
determination of these values. The first step is to calculate relative cash flows for scenario x over
each year, taken with respect to the baseline scenario.
Relative cash flow = (Net Cash Flow)x - (Net Cash FIOW)Baseline
Defining net cash flow as the negative of net cost, we can arrive at an equivalent expression
linking relative cash flow to cost.
Relative cash flow = - [(Net Cost)x - (Net COSt)Baselinel
These relative cash flows define the annual cost (if negative) or savings (if positive) of scenario x
relative to the baseline. Using these relative cash flows, each scenario (relative to the baseline)
can then be rated. First, net present value (NPV) can be calculated as below, where i represents a
given year.
NPV = (Relative Discounted Cash Flows)
An NPV greater than zero indicates that, when compared to the baseline, project i reduces total
cost and should thus be selected. Next, internal rate of return (IRR) is calculated.
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0 = I (Relative Undiscounted Cash Flows) / (1 + IRR)'
IRR is the discount rate that results in an NPV of zero for a given set of cash flows. In some
cases, IRR may not converge or may be less than zero, particularly when initial relative cash
flows are much greater in magnitude than later cash flows. In general, IRR is more problematic
than NPV because of the complex decision rules (outlined in Table 2.2 below) and the possibility
that IRR does not exist for a given scenario, as IRR is not defined if NPV is less than zero.
However, IRR does not depend on discount rate, eliminating the assumption of a static discount
rate over the life of the project.
Table 2.2. Logic defining the interpretation of internal rate of return.
Initially negative, then positive Invest if IRR > Discount Rate
Several sign changes IRR may not be uniquely defined
Finally, payback is simply the length of time required to recoup a given investment, which
means that payback is only a valid metric when NPV is greater than zero and when relative cash
flows are initially negative and eventually positive. This occurs when comparing a scenario with
high initial cost and low operating cost to a scenario with high operating cost and low initial cost.
There are two types of payback: simple and discounted. Simple payback uses undiscounted
relative cash flows while discounted payback uses discounted relative cash flows. If NPV is
greater than zero and relative cash flows are initially positive and eventually negative, payback is
essentially instantaneous. If NPV is less than zero, payback will not be defined.
2.5 Application of Life Cycle Estimator
In the following section, the life cycle cost estimator described above is used to compare
three different primer surfacer application technologies. These three methods entail solventborne,
waterbome, and powder primer surfacer application. To briefly recap: in solventbome primer
application, the paint is dissolved in organic solvents, which evaporate during the curing process.
Solventborne paint application was long the dominant technology in the automotive industry,
though there has been a steady shift away from this method over the past ten to twenty years in
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an effort to curtail VOC emissions. Still, every major automotive manufacturer uses
solventborne coatings on at least some of their products, and VOC emission reductions have
been achieved in solventborne coating processes through increases in the solids content of the
paints and incineration of paint emissions. In waterborne primers, a portion (but not all) of the
organic solvents is replaced by water. When compared to solventborne paints, waterborne paints
are considered to be environmentally friendly and are relatively well-established. The shift from
solventborne to waterborne coatings also does not entail great changes in factory equipment,
though the rheology of waterborne paint is slightly different than that of solventborne paint. The
primary process change is the need for a flash-off step (a low temperature, short duration bake)
to evaporate the water. Finally, powder primer represents a major technological shift away from
liquid paints, but this technology has by far the lowest VOC emissions of any coating method.
The goal of this portion of the study is to determine which of these methods yields the lowest
life cycle cost given the best information currently available. The costs gathered for this section
comes from discussions with GPPC staff, data from existing plants, and examination of historic
trends; much of the underlying data was collected by experts at the GPPC.31 The systems were
chosen to be as similar to one another as possible given the different technologies, and costs
were projected over a twenty year horizon. Rather than reference actual numbers, most of this
section will be used to point out qualitative trends and, when applicable, costs will be indexed
relative to a baseline to protect confidentiality.
Before comparing life cycle cost data, the basic parameters of the coating system must be
defined. The basic inputs used in this model are given in Table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3. Basic inputs common to the three different primer surfacer
deposition systems compared in this section.
Annual production hours 5640
Annual work days 235
Disgu. ae 5
Corporate tax rate 37.5%
31 Schoening, P., and Leddy, L., Personal Communication (2006).
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Annual volume was chosen to be representative of a three shift plant, appropriate for a high
volume product. Film thicknesses, solids content, and transfer efficiency were chosen relative to
standard values for each technique, and each system was assumed to coat an identical surface
area. These quantities are described in Table 2.4 below. The stated transfer efficiency for
powder assumes that powder is being continuously reclaimed, an assumption that will be tested
later.
Table 2.4. Comparison of film thickness and transfer efficiency for the three
methods of primer surfacer application compared in this section.
Solventborne 1 65% 80%
Powder 2.5 N/A 95%
The equations that relate total usage (in gallons for liquids or pounds for powder coatings) are:
Liquid usage = Film Thickness x Surface Area / Transfer Efficiency / Solids Content
Powder usage = Film thickness x Surface Area x Specific Gravity / Transfer Efficiency
The baseline life cycle costs are given in Table 2.5 below, and analysis of investment and
operating costs are described in the following paragraphs.
Table 2.5. Comparison of twenty year life cycle costs for the three primer
surfacer technologies considered.
Solventborne 1.00 1 00 1.00
Waterbme 2 1
Powder 0.97 0.98 0.97
First, Table 2.5 reveals that there are not dramatic differences in cost among the three
methods. In terms of equipment investment, each of these methods is within 5% of each other,
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as the additional specialized equipment required to support one technique over another tends to
be offset by other pieces of equipment no longer required. For example, solventborne systems
require extensive booth abatement, while waterborne systems require a lengthy heated flash
tunnel, and powder systems require a distribution and collection system to reclaim the powder.
Operating costs display more divergence than investment costs, with waterborne primer
commanding nearly a 20% premium over powder primer. This difference can largely be
attributed to differences in material cost; specifically, the relatively high cost of waterborne
primer, given its low solid content. Material costs for powder are kept low by use reclaimed
powder, offsetting the high cost of virgin powder. Powder-based application systems with
reclaim also eliminate the associated with cleaning solvent (required to remove residual paint
from equipment) and waste paint disposal. Labor, a significant cost driver, is roughly identical
for each deposition system.
Taken together, the similarities in investment and operating costs yield similar twenty year
life cycle costs for these three methods. Powder primer has the lowest life cycle cost, while the
life cycle cost of solventborne primer is 3% above that of powder and the life cycle cost of
waterbome primer is approximately 5% above that of powder. Given these relatively minor
differences in life cycle cost, it is worth considering the sensitivity of these costs to various
assumptions. The following analyses were chosen to be illustrative of the long-term trends that
may occur that could affect life cycle costs, and demonstrate how the cost estimator could be
used to analyze these trends, and were thus not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of various
scenarios.
The most simple sensitivity analysis involves the effect of possible changes in the operating
conditions of powder primer systems. First, there is often the perception that the use of
reclaimed powder may cause quality problems. If one were to eliminate the use of reclaimed
powder, transfer efficiency would be reduced dramatically and the twenty year life cycle cost
would rise by 9%. Thus, under these conditions, powder becomes the most expensive deposition
method of the three. A second possible change in operating conditions would involve increases
in the thickness of the primer layer, often perceived to ensure a high level of surface quality. If
this change were to occur, the twenty year life cycle cost rises by 3%, placing costs on par with
solventborne and coatings. Thus, for powder to remain a cost effective option, reclaimed powder
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must be utilized and plant management needs to maintain thickness at the specification limits
defined for the process.
The second component of sensitivity analysis describes how changes in material and energy
costs would affect life cycle cost, using the best case / worst case analysis tool described in
Section 2.3. Since solventborne and waterborne coatings are relatively well-established, it is
unlikely that their material costs will drop considerably. However, powder costs have dropped
rapidly over the past decade, so further drops are conceivable. Thus, an annual drop in powder
costs of 2% was chosen. Regarding energy costs, each method was tested with a flat 5% annual
increase in all utility costs (natural gas, compressed air, electricity, heated water, and chilled
water), a relatively steep inflation rate but not outside the realm of possibility. The results of this
analysis are given in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2. Comparison of the range of twenty year life cycle costs of three
primer application technologies with increasing energy costs and, in the case
of powder deposition, decreasing material costs.
This analysis reveals very little overlap between waterborne and powder primer systems,
indicating that, under the conditions of rising energy costs, powder primer systems (with
standard coating thicknesses and using reclaimed powder) will yield a lower life cycle cost than
waterborne primer systems. Also, if powder costs were to decrease in the future (which may be
expected for a new technology), powder primer systems with higher film builds can be cost-
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competitive with solventborne systems. Finally, Figure 2.2 appears to indicate that rising energy
costs affect each method more or less identically.
To further investigate the impact of energy costs, input leverages can be compared.
Differences in input leverage reveal that changes in the unit cost of line items will affect systems
differently. The results of this analysis are summarized in Figure 2.3, which compares leverage
of selected inputs.
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Figure 2.3. Comparison of input leverage of labor, paint material, and
energy for the three primer surfacer deposition methods. The leverage for
energy is the sum of leverages for natural gas, electricity, compressed air,
chilled water, and hot water consumption.
This figure reveals that, when compared to liquid systems, powder systems are highly dependent
on material costs, since powder material is more costly. All systems display similar dependence
on labor, as staffing requirements are nearly identical. Liquid systems tend to have higher
dependence on energy cost, largely driven by the increased energy required for the flash-off step.
Finally, the effect of changing volume can be explored with Monte Carlo analysis. For this
analysis, annual production volume was varied by independently varying annual production
hours and the jobs per hour to be processed. Annual production hours were varied according to a
truncated triangular distribution, with a minimum of 3500, a most likely value of 5640, and a
maximum of 5640. The maximum annual production hours was kept at 5640 under the
assumption that additional production time could not easily be added to a three shift plant. Line
speed (jobs per hour) was varied according to a triangular distribution, with a minimum of 35,
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peak of 50, and maximum of 60. With these assumptions, the annual volumes could then vary
between 122,500 to 338,400, a very wide range. The implicit assumption in this analysis is that
the plant is more likely to be under-utilized than over-utilized. In each analysis trial, a random
volume is input and used over every year in the projection - an unlikely occurrence, but
remedied by running many trials. The results of this analysis are given in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4. Histograms of twenty year life cycle cost resulting from the
Monte Carlo analysis described above. The analysis was run for each
technique over 10,000 trials.
Because of the similar operating costs for each deposition method, the spread in life cycle cost
for each technique is similar, though the clear benefit of conserving powder material is evident
by the shift in the histogram to the right when film thickness is increased or the powder is not
reclaimed.
2.6 Tool Limitations and Hidden Costs
The comparisons described in section 2.5 dealt solely with investment and operating costs,
and revealed significant overlap between the three primer surfacer deposition techniques.
However, other factors might further separate the life cycle costs of each method, particularly
40
additional costs or benefits described by the hidden costs outlined in section 2.2. In the next
chapter, methodologies for analyzing hidden costs will be described.
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Chapter 3: Modeling Hidden Costs
In the following sections, hidden costs are considered. Since the situation-dependent nature
of these costs precludes standardized analysis, frameworks for analysis of the cost of variation,
cost of disruption, and cost or value of flexibility are instead presented. In each case, a sample
cost calculation is given, with data either taken from actual product figures or generated via
Monte Carlo simulations using reasonable initial assumptions.
3.1 Cost of Variation
The cost of variation is incurred when deviation from process specifications result in a
degradation in product quality. This is potentially the simplest hidden cost to analyze, as
straightforward statistical analysis of historic data will reveal this cost. The main barrier to this
analysis is the difficulty in correlating variation in a specific system to warranty costs that are
typically collected after the fact and are thus reflective of the variation of and interactions
amongst many systems.
The following paragraphs provide an illustrative example of the statistical analysis required
to analyze this class of cost, which can then readily be extended to other data sets. In this
example, we test whether differences in the performance of liquid and powder primer surfacer
systems may lead to higher warranty costs for one method over the other. To undertake this
analysis, then, the null hypothesis (Ho) is that the average warranty costs for vehicles coated with
powder primer surfacer (WCpps) are equal to the average warranty costs for vehicles coated with
liquid primer surfacer (WCLPS), while the alternative hypothesis (He) is the reverse:
HO: WCpps = WCLPS
H0: WCPPs 9 WCLPS
Figure 3.1 presents normalized warranty costs for General Motors' North American paint shops
in 2004.
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Figure 3.1. Normalized warranty cost comparison for vehicles coated with
powder- and solvent-based primer surfacer.
To test the null hypothesis, the relevant test statistic is
WCLPS - WCPPs
Sp
"LPS flpps
where npps is the number of data points for powder, nLPS is the number of data points for liquid,
and Sp is the pooled variance.3 2 The pooled variance is calculated in the formula below:
= (nLPS - +npp - PS
nLPS + npps -2
where oLps is the standard deviation of liquid primer surfacer systems and o-pps is the standard
deviation of powder primer surfacer systems. 3 3 The resulting test statistic can then be compared
to a t-distribution to confirm or reject the null hypothesis.
Using this analysis, the test statistic is -0.14. Note that there is an apparent outlier in the
warranty costs for powder-coated vehicles, attributable to a single plant with a demanding
coating process. However, when this outlier is removed, the test statistic is 0.24. In either case,
for standard confidence levels (e.g. 95%) we fail to reject the null hypothesis; that is, this
analysis demonstrates that, using the data at hand, warranty costs for vehicles coated with
32 Montgomery, D.C., Introduction to Statistical Process Control, Fourth Edition. United States, John Wiley & Sons
(2004), p. 118.
" Ibid.
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powder primer surfacer are no different than warranty costs for vehicles coated with liquid
primer surfacer. There are of course limitations with this analysis. For example, vehicles coated
with powder primer surfacer may be subject to different standards when deciding whether or not
repairs are warranted, or these different primer technologies may be used to serve entirely
different customer segments. Finally, warranty costs could be offset by process modifications
that may increase operating costs elsewhere in the paint shop. However, this sort of statistical
analysis provides at least an important first-pass assessment of the cost of variation, and similar
analysis can be extended elsewhere if the data is available.
3.2 Cost of Disruption
Analysis of the cost of disruption is more open-ended than the calculation of the cost of
variation described above. Generally, disruption costs are incurred whenever an interruption in
the production line affects the throughput of the plant, as this disruption affects the ability of the
plant to convert is inventory into cash flow. Disruption also occurs whenever a process change
results in increased rework or warranty costs. This cost can play a critical role in assessing the
merits of different factory investments, particularly since investment and operating costs of
competing technologies are often very different.
One possible method to evaluate the cost of disruption would be to correlate downtime events
of the system under consideration with lost production time, and determine the cost of this lost
production time. However, this type of analysis is fraught with complications. First, downtime
events are inherently unpredictable, and past events may not correlate well with future
occurrences. In particular, a single catastrophic event, which should occur with low frequency,
could dominate these estimates. Second, the production data for the system of interest may
simply not exist, particularly for new equipment. Equipment suppliers may be able to furnish
their downtime estimates, but data from the laboratory is notoriously difficult to translate into a
production environment, with multiple operators and interdependent systems. Finally,
automotive plants employ extensive buffers, offline processing capabilities, and scheduled
maintenance intervals to help maintain flow through the plant during normal production hours.
Thus, an isolated event may not be sufficient to interrupt production. Given these complications,
this work uses another framework for analyzing the cost of disruption.
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To simplify the analysis required to derive the cost of disruption, a second method can be
employed wherein focus is placed on the bottleneck in the process. As described by Goldratt's
Theory of Constraints, lost time at a bottleneck is equivalent to lost production time for the entire
plant, while lost time elsewhere will not affect overall flow through the plant.34 Thus, extending
this approach, the cost of disruption could simply be expressed as the amount of time lost at the
bottleneck multiplied by the potential revenue lost during this time. On the other hand, when
non-bottleneck systems fail, no cost of disruption would be incurred provided flow through the
bottleneck is not affected. While this theory offers a simple framework for maximizing flow
through a plant, it is more restrictive than the original description of the cost of disruption
outlined in Section 2.2. For example, when a non-bottleneck system fails in an automotive plant,
significant resources may be expended to bring this system back on-line. Additionally, new
systems (whether or not they are bottlenecks) incur significant learning effects that may not be
captured using the analysis suggested by the Theory of Constraints. Thus, this method of
analyzing the cost of disruption was also rejected.
The final method of analysis utilizes a top-down approach derived from experience curves
and is the simplest of the three. Experience curves describe the reduction in effort required to
manufacture an item as the cumulative output of that item increases. Effort can be a variety of
metrics, such as direct cost, labor content, manufacturing cost, or throughput time. This
phenomenon, first observed at the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in 1936 3 and later extended
by Bruce Henderson at the Boston Consulting Group in the 1970s, 3 6 has been shown to apply to
a wide variety of manufacturing systems. The general shape of an experience curve is given in
Figure 3.2 below.
34 Goldratt, E. The Goal, Third Revised Edition.Great Barrington, MA, North River Press (2004).
3 Wright, T., "Factors Affecting the Costs of Airplanes," Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences 3 (1936), 122.
36 Henderson, B., "Perspectives on Experience," Boston, MA, Boston Consulting Group (1972).
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Figure 3.2. General representation of an experience curve, using a variety of
values for b. Both axes are logarithmic scales.
The equation governing experience curves is
Yx =yiXZ
where yx is the effort required to produce the unit xth unit, yj is the effort required to produce the
first unit, z = ln(b) / ln(2), and b is a constant experience curve factor. 37 The experience curve
factor b describes the percentage of effort that is retained when production output is doubled.
For most manufacturing systems, b is in the range of 70% - 90%.38 The primary danger in
analyzing experience curves is the potential intermingling with economies of scale (where fixed
costs are amortized over increasing output). Thus, this method is best employed in areas where
scale economies do not apply.
Because the experience curve describes an aggregation of phenomena that reduce
manufacturing effort, this is a simple and powerful method with which to analyze the cost of
disruption, and applicable to many different areas in automotive manufacturing. For example,
two types of experience curves, taken directly from General Motors manufacturing data, are
given in Figure 3.3.
37 Kalligeros, K., "Platforms and Real Options in Large-Scale Engineering Systems." Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2006, p.3 0 .
3 8Ibid, p. 31.
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Figure 3.3. Sample experience curves from General Motors manufacturing.
(a) Reduction in rework rate of vehicles after new model introduction. The
M designation refers to vehicle platform for those models, while the P
designation refers to the plant at which production occurs. (b) Reduction in
paint material costs after new model introduction. Both axes are logarithmic
scales.
Figure 3.3(a) shows the evolution of rework rate for several new model introductions, indicating
that rework rates show an initial spike and gradual drop as production output increases. For all
curves, the fitted experience curve factor b was between 75% and 85%. Generally, the new
models that showed the highest initial spike in rework rates were those that differed most from
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A XM2P3
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their predecessors, either in vehicle design or production methods. Note that platform 2 was
produced in both plant 2 and plant 3 (M2P2 and M2P3), and their rework rates are nearly
identical. This indicates that learning has been effectively transmitted between the two plants.
Figure 3.3(b) shows the evolution of per-vehicle paint material cost with cumulative output in
one of the plants and models cited in Figure 3.3(a) (MLPI). While per-vehicle labor and
warranty costs display strong economies of scale, as shown in Figure 3.4, per-vehicle paint
material costs do not, indicating that this drop can be attributed to the cumulative effect of
experience. In Figure 3.3(b), the fitted experience curve factor b was equal to 86%. Both of
these examples demonstrate the strong cumulative effect of experience, and are both independent
of any economies of scale that may be at play.
* Labor
o Material
A Warranty0
Total Output
Figure 3.4. Comparison of per-vehicle labor, material, and warranty costs
for selected General Motors paint shops. Data is taken from 2004 for United
States and Canadian plants. Labor and warranty costs display strong
economies of scale while material costs do not.
Before translating experience curves to the cost of disruption, two notes of caution are
warranted. First, as noted above, reductions in effort that accompany increased experience are
sometimes difficult to separate from economies of scale. Great care should be taken to ensure
that the cost reduction being observed cannot solely be attributed to the amortization of fixed
costs over increasing output. Second, experience curves, particularly those that cover broad
swaths of data, often represent an aggregation of phenomena with their own individual
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experience curves and values of b. For example, a new piece of equipment processing a new
design may have two relevant experience curves -- one associated with learning how to produce
the design and the other with using the equipment. Also, the rate of learning may change with
turnover of personnel within an organization. 39 Therefore, when making extrapolations from
past data, it is imperative to consider whether the sorts of actions that reduced effort in the past
will continue in the future.
With these disclaimers in mind, to translate an experience curve to the cost of disruption, one
simply needs the initial spike in effort, the experience curve factor b, and the target level of effort.
For the initial spike in effort, similar situations to the one in question can serve as a valuable
guide. When the basis of effort is not cost, as in Figure 3.3(a), effort must be translated to cost.
For example, one could translate rework rate to cost by determining the average cost to rework a
vehicle in each of the situations described in Figure 3.3(a). For the experience curve factor b, if
previous estimates are not available, a rate of 85% can often be assumed without too much error.
Finally, the target level of effort is often dictated by management policy. With these values in
place, one can integrate the area under the experience curve to derive an estimate for the cost of
disruption, as shown in Figure 3.5 below.
39 Argote, L. Organizational Learning: Creating, Retaining, and Transferring Knowledge, Boston, Kluwer
Academic (1999), p. 22.
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Figure 3.5. Illustration of the cost of disruption, derived from an experience
curve and a target effort for the process in question. Both axes are
logarithmic scales.
While this estimation method may seem crude, it quickly allows one to estimate the magnitude
of the cost of disruption and compare it to the life cycle cost described in the previous chapter. If
the cost of disruption appears significant, more detailed estimation methods can be employed.
3.3 Cost and Value of Flexibility
The final class of hidden cost to be considered is the cost of flexibility, which must be
balanced against its benefit. In general, these costs and benefits are realized when a
manufacturer chooses to pay an initial premium for flexibility to derive some later benefit.
These situations represent so-called "real options" and can be analyzed using techniques
analogous to financial options. In this section, Monte Carlo analysis will be employed to
calculate option value for two distinct situations. In the first case, the cost and value of having
the flexibility to process two different vehicle platforms in a single paint shop will be considered.
In the second case, the value of staging upgrades to operations in two different facilities, where
the upgrade in one facility is delayed until it is evaluated in a second facility, is determined.
These situations are meant to provide a guide for how the cost and value of flexibility can be
determined, and the exact numbers used are highly situation-dependent.
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The cost and value of flexibility is a particularly relevant topic for paint shops, as they are the
inherently the most flexible areas of automotive assembly.40 Hypothetically, any vehicle can be
coated in any given paint shop, provided that the coating equipment and conveyors will
accommodate the vehicle and the desired color palette is available. Furthermore, though
different coating processes are chosen for different plants and vehicles, there is a large degree of
commonality between processes. Therefore, this is an area of automotive assembly in which the
cost of flexibility could be low and the benefits may be quite high. However, practical
limitations mean that today's paint shops are not completely flexible. A key question remains as
to how much additional flexibility is economically justified.
3.3.1 Case 1: Processing different vehicle platforms in a common facility
In this example, a new paint shop has been planned as part of a new assembly plant devoted
to a new platform, and the crux of the decision is whether this new paint shop should
accommodate a second (existing) vehicle platform as well. If the second vehicle platform were
accommodated in this plant, an existing plant could be closed. This sort of aggregation of
different products into an existing plant has been cited as a means of reducing chronic excess
capacity, holding steady at 20% over the past fifteen years and plaguing the entire automotive
industry.4 1 However, there will be a premium for this flexibility. First, the facility cost will
increase, as the paint shop needs to be designed with a second platform in mind. This means that
the facility will likely need to be higher capacity than if it were dedicated to a single platform. It
also means that the facility layout, size, and specific systems are different than if a single
platform were to be processed there. For example, the second platform may require larger
clearances in the furnaces used to cure the various coating layers, or additional steps to conform
to product or market requirements. There will also be a premium in operating costs, as the
complexity inherent in flexibility will likely require plant personnel to undergo significant
learning before the plant runs smoothly.
In exchange for this premium, we assume that an existing plant can be idled, as production
will move to this new flexible facility. We also assume that the existing plant can be idled
40 Zielke, A., et al., "Race 2015: Refueling Automotive Companies' Economics." Germany, McKinsey & Company
(2005) p. 71.
4' Ibid, p. 57.
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without cost; in reality, closing a plant may involve significant costs. Ignoring this complication,
by closing an existing plant, we can eliminate the operating costs associated with this existing
facility. Additionally, the aggregation of demand for each of these two platforms could help
smooth production scheduling in the new facility, leading to higher average capacity utilization.
The Monte Carlo simulations described below will thus consider when having flexibility in
this new plant results in lower total cost over the life of the model. Note that all costs considered
below are for the paint shop only; in principle, however, the conclusions of the model can be
extended to an entire assembly plant. The baseline scenario is one in which we elect not to pay
the premium for flexibility in this new plant and keep the existing plant open, thus lowering the
required capacity of the new facility. With this description in mind, on overview of the
simulation is described by Figure 3.6.
Calculations
Stochastic Inputs Scenario 1: with flexibility Output
r_ Up-front investment,
10 year projected 10 year operating costs NPV for each scenario
production volumes for NPV1 - NPV2 =
platform 1 (existing) and cost or value of flexibility
platform 2 (new) Scenario 2: without flexibility
Up-front investment,
10 year operating costs
Figure 3.6. Description of the model used to derive the value of flexibility in
Case 1.
The steps required to determine the cost or value of flexibility in this scenario are outlined below.
1. Determine the distribution that governs expected capacity utilization in the assembly
plants. This will be used to generate production volumes over the ten years of the
simulation.
2. Determine the investment and operating costs associated with this capacity in each of
these plants. Operating costs are driven by simulated production volumes.
3. Compare the baseline scenario, where the existing plant is kept open and the new facility
is inflexible, to the scenario where the new plant is flexible and the existing plant is
closed. The difference between these two scenarios represents the cost or value of
flexibility.
Next, details of these steps are outlined below.
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In this simulation, the stochastic inputs that form the basis for the subsequent operating costs
are the volumes of each vehicle platform demanded over a ten year span. For simplicity, this
model assumes that demand and production are identical, so plant managers do not have the
option of delaying orders in times of high demand in order to supplement periods of low demand.
In a lean production system, this should largely be the case. The shape of the distribution
function that governs the production volumes for a given year must thus be determined. To do
so, monthly capacity utilization for the past five years was determined in eight General Motors
paint shops, all located in North America. The distribution of capacity utilization over this time
span is given in Figure 3.7.
14% 120%
12% 100%
10%
80% Z
8% 0
60%
.0 >&_6% -
40%
4% - E
n II
0% 0%
Capacity Utilization
Figure 3.7. Distribution of capacity utilization in General Motors paint
shops, derived by examining a five year history of eight different plants. The
left axis is the probability distribution of capacity utilization (represented by
the columns), while the right axis is the cumulative probability distribution
of capacity utilization.
This figure shows that capacity utilization in paint shops appears to follow a normal distribution,
though the distribution features an extended tail towards the low end of capacity utilization.
Because the normal distribution is easy to simulate in Monte Carlo simulations, the average
capacity utilization histogram given in Figure 3.7(a) was approximated with a normal curve.
Figure 3.8 shows the results of a least-squares fit to average capacity utilization, using the
normal distribution as the fitting curve. While the probability distributions appear to match
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reasonably well, the cumulative distribution shown in Figure 3.8(b) reveals that fitting the
capacity utilization with a normal distribution severely underestimates the low end of the actual
data.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.8. Fit to capacity utilization shown in Figure 3.7 using a normal
distribution. (a) Probability distribution of capacity utilization. (b)
Cumulative probability distribution of capacity utilization.
Since the normal distribution severely underestimates the probability of low levels of capacity
utilization, a better fit was sought. In Figure 3.9, a hybrid distribution was used to match
simulated and actual capacity utilization. Low values of capacity utilization are uniformly
distributed, while high values are normally distributed. The distribution shown in this figure is
the result of simulating 25,000 trials of capacity utilization using this hybrid distribution. The
match to the actual capacity utilization is much better than when a normal distribution is used
exclusively; hence, this hybrid distribution was used to simulate production volumes over the ten
years of this analysis.
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Figure 3.9. Fit to capacity utilization shown in Figure 3.7 using a hybrid
distribution. (a) Probability distribution of capacity utilization. (b)
Cumulative probability distribution of capacity utilization.
The distribution in Figure 3.9 also gives an average value of capacity utilization which can be
used in the Monte Carlo simulations.
With the distribution that governs production volume defined, the next step is to relate
investment and operating costs to these volumes. Figure 3.10 details the investment costs of
selected General Motors North America paint shops versus capacity. Since the data for this
figure spans approximately fifteen years, all investment costs were converted to 2006 dollars.
This figure demonstrates that the investment in capacity has both a fixed and variable component
and can be approximated with a linear curve fit (R2 = 0.77).
0
(0
Capacity
Figure 3.10. Investment costs of selected GM paint shops (in 2006 dollars)
versus capacity.
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Figure 3.11 details operating costs of General Motors North American paint shops in 2004
versus the capacity of each paint shop. As was the case with investment costs, operating costs
have both a fixed and variable component and can be modeled with a simple linear curve fit (R2
= 0.75).
0
0)
Capacity
Figure 3.11. Operating costs (from 2004) of GM paint shops versus capacity.
The data presented in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 enables calculation of investment and
operating costs of a paint shop operating up to full capacity.
For times when a paint shop exceeds its capacity, labor costs should increase accordingly to
account for overtime. To estimate the magnitude of this increase, a breakdown of operating cost
components in General Motors North America paint shops was performed, using data taken from
2004. This breakdown is given in Figure 3.12, which reveals that approximately one third of
operating costs are devoted to labor. Thus, to approximate the effect of overtime in this model,
labor costs were doubled for each vehicle produced beyond the plant's capacity, resulting in 66%
higher operating costs for these vehicles. Note that this approximation neglects the possible
additional operating costs associated with increased wear and tear on equipment or postponement
of preventive maintenance procedures.
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Figure 3.12. Operating cost breakdown (from 2004) of GM paint shops.
Approximately 33% of operating costs are devoted to labor.
Next, the operating cost premium for flexibility must be determined. After consultation with
experts at General Motors, a simple model was proposed. Investment costs for a flexible plant
exhibit a fixed operating cost premium over an inflexible plant (15%), while operating costs
display an initial premium (again, usually 15%) that can decrease over time. The rate of
operating cost reduction in a flexible plant is governed by an experience curve, which features an
initial increase in operating cost and a constant experience curve factor b that describes the
decrease over time.
Finally, the simulation can be run by simulating production volumes for each platform, and
total cost for each scenario can be derived. The total cost of a given scenario is simply the net
present value (NPV) of investment and operating costs, both of which are dictated by the
simulated production volumes. The cost or value of flexibility is then simply the difference
between the NPV for a flexible and inflexible plant. Using this model, a variety of scenarios
were run, the results of which are outlined below. In all cases, 1,000 trials were run over a ten
year horizon, and the discount rate was fixed at 15%.
First, the effect of capacity was examined, as shown in Figure 3.13. The total system
capacity was fixed at the values indicated in this figure, and the model mix was fixed at three
values (25%, 50%, or 75% of total capacity devoted to the new platform, on average). For the
case where the new plant is flexible and the existing plant is closed, total system capacity is
simply the capacity of this new plant. For the baseline case, where the new plant is inflexible
42 Claya, J., Personal Communication (2006).
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and the existing plant is kept open, total system capacity is the sum of the capacities of the two
individual plants. Average capacity utilization is given by the peak value given in Figure 3.9(a)
and operating costs were determined for each year given the simulated demand at the time. In
the scenario where a flexible plant was built, operating costs experienced an initial spike of 15%
and declined with a constant experience curve factor b of 85%.
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Figure 3.13. Effect of total system capacity on the cost or value of flexibility
for three different product mixes. Flexibility adds value when the y-axis is
positive. The amount of total capacity devoted to the new platform is given
by the values in the legend. The initial premium in operating cost in the
flexible plant was fixed at 15%, b was set to 85%, and average capacity
utilization was fixed at the peak value in Figure 3.9(a).
This figure reveals that flexibility adds value when the total system capacity is low. In other
words, when production volumes are low, economies of scale are weak and aggregating
production into a single flexibility facility results in lower total cost despite the premium one has
to pay for this flexibility. Furthermore, when the existing platform is low volume (that is, when
most of the total system capacity is devoted to the new model), flexibility adds the most value.
This effect is again due to economies of scale: the fixed component of operating costs means that
the existing low volume platform cannot be processed inexpensively in a dedicated facility. To
summarize, this figure shows that, for production volumes where economies of scale are weak,
flexibility tends to add value.
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Next, the effect of capacity utilization was examined, as shown in Figure 3.14. This figure
shows the benefit or cost of flexibility versus the average capacity utilization for each plant over
a ten year time span. In this figure, total system capacity was set at 200,000 units, half of the
capacity was devoted to the new platform, the initial premium in operating costs in the flexible
plant was set to 15%, and b was fixed at 85%. This figure demonstrates that changes in capacity
utilization have a weak effect on the cost or benefit of flexibility. As the average capacity
utilization drops, the benefit of flexibility increases, since only a single plant is being run at these
low capacity levels. Thus, flexibility can actually serve as a buffer against low capacity
utilization.
5%
Z4%
x 3%
o 2%
1%
0%
70% 80% 90% 100% 110%
Capacity Utilizaton
Figure 3.14. Effect of capacity utilization on the cost or benefit of flexibility.
Total system capacity was fixed at 200,000 units, half of the total capacity
was devoted to the new platform, the initial premium in operating cost in the
flexible plant was fixed at 15%, and b was set to 85%.
Finally, experience effects were examined by varying the experience curve factor b, as
shown in Figure 3.15. In these simulations, total system capacity was fixed at 200,000 units,
average capacity utilization was set to the peak value in Figure 3.9(a), half of the total capacity
was devoted to the new platform, and the initial premium in operating cost in the flexible plant
was fixed at 15%. This figure shows that high learning rates (low values of b) enable a plant to
maximize the value derived from flexibility by quickly reducing the operating cost premium.
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Figure 3.15. Effect of the experience curve factor b on the cost or benefit of
flexibility. Total system capacity was fixed at 200,000 units, average capacity
utilization was set to the peak value in Figure 3.9(a), half of the total capacity
was devoted to the new platform, and the initial premium in operating cost in
the flexible plant was fixed at 15%.
Taken together, these simulations reveal a relatively broad range of conditions where a new
flexible facility can be used to accommodate both a new platform and existing platform,
allowing an existing paint shop to close. While highly theoretical in nature, they can apply to
real situations; e.g. the aggregation of existing low volume platforms into a paint shop designed
for a new high volume platform. These simulations also suggest that since the investment and
operating costs of paint shops are so high, significant benefits could be derived by having a
common paint shop linking two different body and general assembly areas, as shown in Figure
3.16 below. The fabrication techniques used in the body shop and in general assembly could be
completely different, but the inherent flexibility in paint shops allows the vehicles to share
coating processes. In fact, this arrangement is currently in place at the General Motors plant in
Oshawa, Ontario.
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Figure 3.16. Schematic depicting the arrangement of body and general
assembly facilities to take advantage of a single flexible paint shop.
The next set of simulations takes us from the high-level view of plant costs described above to
the case of diffusion of a specific operating improvement throughout the plant network.
3.3.2 Case 2: Staging operating improvements in two different facilities
In this example, an improvement in plant operations that is expected to yield a reduction in
per-vehicle operating costs is being considered at two different facilities. The improvement in
per-vehicle operating cost comes at the expense of an initial investment. This improvement can
be simultaneously introduced at both facilities, or the decision to introduce the improvement in
the second facility can be contingent upon its performance in the first, with the assumption that
learning can be effectively transmitted between the two facilities. If the decision to delay is
made, the improvement cannot come online until the next year, as the upgrade requires an
investment in time as well. While waiting to perform this upgrade enables the second facility to
defer the implementation cost and avoid any potential implementation problems, deferment may
cause the second plant to miss out on the operating cost reductions if implementation goes well
in the first facility. In some cases in the simulations described below, the implementation of the
improvement in the first facility could be so problematic that it actually results in an increase in
operating costs there for some time, which is not an uncommon situation in manufacturing
environments. Thus, these simulations also provide additional insight into the cost of disruption.
The Monte Carlo simulations below describe the extra value derived by waiting and the
optimal implementation time for a range of assumptions. As in the previous case, the inputs to
the simulations are production volumes, in this case for the second facility. In fact, an identical
distribution to that used in Figure 3.9 is used to describe production volumes in the second plant,
using a mean demand level of 100,000 vehicles per year. These stochastic production volumes
are then multiplied by per-vehicle cost savings to arrive at the total operating cost savings for
that year. Also, experience curves are again used to describe the rate of improvement in
61
operating cost savings; an initial decrease in savings (which may actually result in negative
savings; i.e. increased operating cost) evolves according to the experience curve factor b towards
the ideal per-vehicle savings. The final input is the time delay in implementing the improvement
in the second plant; each trial in the simulation consists of time delays ranging from one to ten
years, and the optimal delay time is recorded. The optimal delay time is not an artificial
construct; in real life, plant management in the second facility would likely closely track the
progress of implementation in the first and perform this calculation continuously. For each
simulation, 1,000 trials were run over a ten year time horizon. The value of flexibility was
determined by comparing the net present value of the operating improvement in the second plant
with and without the implementation delay. Because there is always the option to not implement
the improvement in the second plant, the value of flexibility is always greater than zero in the
following discussion.
First, the trade-off between implementation cost and per-vehicle operating cost savings was
examined. Figure 3.17 presents a three dimensional plot that displays the value of flexibility
versus the initial implementation cost and the projected per-vehicle operating cost savings. The
initial per-vehicle operating cost savings was set to zero (i.e. no cost savings in the first year),
and b, which governs the rate at which actual cost savings approach the potential savings shown
on this graph, was set to 85%. This plot reveals a wide area in which the value of flexibility is
greater than zero. Within these areas, the optimal delay ranges from one to six years -
essentially, the project is implemented when the discounted implementation cost is exceeded by
the potential per-vehicle operating cost savings. In areas where the option value is zero, the
improvement should never be implemented because the NPV of per-vehicle cost savings is not
larger than the initial implementation cost.
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Figure 3.17. Value of flexibility for different implementation costs and
potential per-vehicle operating cost savings. Initial per-vehicle operating cost
savings was set to 0, and b was set to 85%.
Next, the effect of varying the initial per-vehicle operating cost savings is examined. Figure
3.18 presents two plots that display the value of flexibility versus the initial implementation cost
and the projected per-vehicle operating cost savings. For clarity, these figures have identical
vertical scales to each other and to Figure 3.17. In both plots, b was set to 85%. In Figure
3.18(a), the initial per-vehicle operating cost savings was set to 20% of the potential savings,
while in Figure 3.18(b) operating costs were initially increased by 20%. Thus, for a potential
per-vehicle operating cost savings of $5.00, the initial per-vehicle savings is $1.00 in Figure
3.18(a) while the initial per-vehicle added cost is $1.00 in Figure 3.18(b). However, in both
cases, they trend towards the same value. In general, the value of flexibility is generally non-
zero when the implementation cost is low compared to the potential cost savings. In the right
portion of Figure 3.18(a), the value of flexibility is zero because the improvement is never
implemented, as potential savings are swamped by the implementation cost. In the left portion
of this plot, the value of flexibility is zero because the improvement is immediately implemented
to take advantage of the per-vehicle cost savings. In Figure 3.18(b), the value of flexibility is
again zero when cost savings are significant compared to implementation costs. The areas where
the value of flexibility is zero are regions in which the upgrade is never performed, largely
because of the high implementation cost. Compared to Figure 3.17, the region of zero value is
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larger because of the higher initial reduction in per-vehicle cost savings. Because of the initial
increase in operating costs in Figure 3.18(b), the value of flexibility is highest in this scenario, as
implementation is delayed until operating costs are reduced. In both of these plots, optimal
delays ranged from one to five years.
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Figure 3.18. Value of flexibility for different implementation costs and
potential per-vehicle operating cost savings. In both plots, b was set to 85%.
(a) Initial operating cost savings compared to the projected was set to 20%.
(b) Initial operating costs increase by 20%.
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Finally, the effect of the experience curve factor b and initial per-vehicle cost savings
(expressed as a percent of the potential savings; negative values imply initial operating costs
have increased) is examined in Figure 3.19 below, which is a plot of the value of flexibility
versus these two factors. In this figure, implementation cost was fixed at $500,000 and potential
per-vehicle operating cost savings was $5.00. Again, this plot reveals a broad range of values in
which the value of flexibility is greater than zero. This plot reveals that the magnitude of initial
cost savings has the strongest effect on the value of flexibility. Optimal implementation delays
ranged from one to four years in this plot.
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Figure 3.19. Value of flexibility for different experience curve factors (b) and
initial per-vehicle operating cost savings. Implementation cost was fixed at
$500,000 and potential operation cost savings was fixed at $5.00 per vehicle.
Taken together, these simulations demonstrate the value of efficiently transferring learning
from one plant to another, rather than simultaneously rolling out process changes in each plant.
The above figures indicate that this staged approach can result in substantial cost savings,
depending on the nature of the process improvement.
3.4 Hidden Costs: A Broader Perspective
The three classes of hidden costs (variation, disruption, and flexibility) described above can
potentially significantly impact the life cycle cost projections discussed in Chapter 2. However,
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the importance of hidden costs goes beyond financial projections and touches upon issues as
diverse as corporate culture, organizational design, and managerial incentives.
The semiconductor industry, and Intel in particular, provide a vivid case study of how hidden
costs can impact these broader areas. Intel is the largest semiconductor manufacturer in the
world and commands a dominant share in the microprocessor market. It is also a technological
leader, defining the pace of innovation in the industry through Moore's Law. Moore's Law, first
proposed by Gordon Moore (then a manager at Fairchild, later chairman of Intel), states that the
43density of transistors on a computer chip doubles every two years. Moore's Law defines an
incredible trajectory of change within the industry, ensuring a constant stream of challenges
related to sustaining the pace of innovation necessary to meet this trend and ramping up each
new generation of microprocessors realized through these innovations.
In essence, each generation of microprocessors represents a major disruption for the
semiconductor industry, accompanied by major disruption costs as each chip fabrication plant
(commonly denoted with the shorthand "fab" within the semiconductor industry; each fab is
responsible for a family of product based on a given technology) struggles to implement the new
process necessary for those products. In the past, each fab would experience initially low yields,
which would take months or years to reach acceptable values, since learning was not being
effectively transmitted between the fabs. In response to this major disruption cost, Intel
developed its Copy Exactly! philosophy, where each fab copies the development fab down to the
exact details.44' 45 With this process in place, Intel was able to eliminate the cost of disruption,
resulting in new chip fabs instantly achieving the yields established in other plants. The effect of
the Copy Exactly! approach on yields is depicted schematically in Figure 3.20.
4 Moore, G., "Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits," Electronics Magazine 8 (1965) 567.
44 Gasser, R.A., "Achieving High Microprocessor Manufacturing Output - The Copy Exactly! Method,"
International Electron Devices Meeting Technical Digest (2002) 318.
45 Natarajan, S., et al., "Process Development and Manufacturing of High-Performance Microprocessors on 300mm
Wafers," Intel Technology Journal 6 (2002) 14.
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Figure 3.20. Schematic of yield curves before and after implementation of
Copy Exactly!, modeled after Terwiesch and Yu.46 Arrows point to yield loss
at the time of technology transfer to the new fab.
This philosophy was a large cultural change in an organization full of technologists, and called
upon extreme discipline in avoiding the urge to constantly implement process improvements
(which often backfire) in each new facility.
The preceding example shows that when hidden costs are properly considered, their impact
goes beyond cost estimation. The following chapter examines some of the broader issues of cost
projections as they relate to the Global Paint and Polymers Center at GM.
46 Terwiesch, C. and Xu, Y., "The Copy-Exactly Ramp-Up Strategy: Trading-Off Learning With Process Change,"
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 51 (2004) 71.
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Chapter 4: Organizational Analysis: Linking Costs to
Managerial Objectives
As described in Section 3.4, organizational structure and managerial incentives can
determine which costs are emphasized and which are neglected. Before Copy Exactly! was
implemented at Intel, each factory viewed itself as responsible for designing the optimal
production process for their facility. Therefore, process improvements were uncoordinated and
resulted in unintended hidden costs; individual facilities viewed the long ramp-up times as an
inevitable cost associated with deployment of leading-edge production processes. When the cost
of disruption became apparent, Copy Exactly! was adopted and process learning became
coordinated across fabs. In short, Copy Exactly! was the managerial vehicle through which
hidden costs could be reduced or eliminated.
In general, while the methods outlined in Chapter 3 allow us to determine what these hidden
costs may be, they do not explain why they exist in the first place or how best to address them.
Therefore, we cannot fully assess the impact of the techniques described in Chapters 2 and 3 of
this work without understanding the dynamics that underlie the decision making processes in an
organization. To this end, in the following discussion, the potential impact of the quantitative
methods used in this work on the Global Paint and Polymers Center (GPPC) organization is
considered. First, a description of the GPPC organization is given, and the internal and external
forces that guide decision making are considered. Next, some recommendations for improving
the organization's cost estimation procedures are provided.
4.1 Description of the Global Paint and Polymers Center (GPPC)
General Motors operates dozens of automotive assembly plants located throughout the world,
used to manufacture a wide variety of vehicles across twelve brands (Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet,
GMC, GM Daewoo, Holden, HUMMER, Opel, Pontiac, Saab, Saturn and Vauxhall). These
plants differ widely in the processes employed, partly due to local variations in labor costs and
product requirements, and partly reflective of the various acquisitions made by General Motors
throughout the years. Each region has its own regional manufacturing management, which is
further divided into individual plant management. To link these regions together, global
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manufacturing engineering organizations such as the GPPC are utilized. A schematic of the
organizational structure for GM manufacturing is shown in Figure 4.1.
Global
Manufacturing
Manufacturing Regional
Engineering Manufacturing
GPCC IndividualPlants
Figure 4.1. Schematic of GM global manufacturing organization. The
parallel bars indicate there are multiple levels between the two levels
depicted.
The GPPC exists to provide worldwide support to GM paint shops, serve as a centralized
source of best practices, and provide a common avenue for process improvement validation;
there are analogs to the GPPC in other areas of manufacturing as well. The entire GPPC consists
of approximately 200 employees, specialized in such areas as paint facilities, materials, exterior
polymers, and product design. Most GPPC personnel are located at GM's Technical Center in
Warren, MI, though the GPPC also has on-site resident engineers at plants and plant liaisons that
travel between the central office and their assigned facilities. Though a similar organization has
existed in GM North America for many years, the GPPC officially assumed its global role
recently.
Because the GPPC functions in a support role, external forces significantly impact the nature
of the work done there. The three most important influences on the GPPC are management at
individual plants, the GM's Worldwide Facilities Group, and suppliers or contractors to
individual plants.
4.2 Relationship of GPPC with Manufacturing Plants
Plant management plays an important role in shaping the nature of the work done at the GPPC,
particularly when GPPC is engaged in support or validation. Regarding plant support, plants
tend request assistance from GPPC personnel, with plant liaisons functioning as pull signals for
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this help. Thus, plants have a high degree of autonomy, as they can choose whether or not to
utilize the GPPC to assist in their operations. Regarding new equipment validation, plant
management must agree to any testing of process improvements developed by the GPPC. To
deal with these coordination challenges effectively, members of the GPPC need to have close
working relationships with individuals at different plants, underscoring the importance of the
plant liaisons and resident engineers. This often requires GPPC engineers to be off-site for a
significant fraction of their time, engaged in various long-term projects with different plants.
The coordination challenge is magnified by the recent shift to a global organization, since
regions had more autonomy in the past, and GPPC personnel must now build effective working
relationships around the world.
Another area in which GPPC interests are intermingled with that of individual plants is in the
budgeting process. For example, the GPPC budget includes material costs at all General Motors
paint shops. Thus, individual plants are free to choose coating processes that maximize their
metrics of interest without fear of being penalized for additional material costs. While this
budgeting choice avoids the incentive for plants to try to cut operating costs by cutting back on
coating thickness (and possibly paying a long term cost from reduced quality), it does create a
situation in which the GPPC is not directly responsible for a component of its budget.
4.3 GPPC and the Worldwide Facilities Group
When a new paint shop is planned, a team composed of personnel from both the GPPC and
Worldwide Facilities Group (WFG) is formed to evaluate the necessary investment to meet the
projected product requirements. WFG is responsible for controlling investment costs and
delivering the project on time, responsibilities shared with the GPPC. Because of the
competitive dynamics of the automotive industry described in Chapter 1, the drive to reduce
investment costs is incredibly strong. However, a built-in source of tension between WFG and
GPPC centers on the additional metrics used by GPPC personnel when evaluating a project.
Since the GPPC will have an ongoing support role with the plant, control of operating costs and
minimization of hidden costs are also important criteria in their decision-making process. These
sometimes competing metrics can set up situations in which investment cost is given precedence
over life cycle cost, leading to sub-optimal decision where the long-term benefits are traded for
short-term costs savings. Furthermore, the drive to reduce investment cost places enormous
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pressure on suppliers to meet project budgets, which can potentially strain the relationship
between GM and its suppliers.
4.4 GPPC and Suppliers
Finally, suppliers, particularly on the equipment side, play an important role in shaping the
work done by the GPPC. These suppliers play an important role in the paint shop during the
construction phase and continue to provide support after the plant goes online. In fact, as the
automotive industry shifts to more collaborative OEM-supplier relationships, suppliers have
steadily gained more of a voice in the design and operation of the paint shop. In the extreme
case, a recent Daimler-Chrysler paint shop is actually being run by its suppliers, and Daimler-
Chrysler pays a per-vehicle cost for each vehicle coated in that facility. The transition to this
model has not been smooth; the original contractor (Haden) declared bankruptcy in early 2006
and another supplier (Magna Steyr) was brought in to execute the contract. While GM has not
attempted this model to date, they still work closely with suppliers to the paint shop, and the
future will likely bring closer collaboration between GM and its paint shop suppliers.
As suppliers have taken on a more active role in paint shop facility and process design, they
have also increasingly taken on a leadership role in driving research and development activities.
At General Motors, this enables organizations such as the GPPC to act as intermediaries between
suppliers unveiling new processes and plants considering whether or not to utilize these
processes. However, in this role, GPPC can only indirectly influence each party, complicating
the diffusion of new technologies into the plant.
A recent change in industry dynamic has been the increased use of intellectual property by
suppliers in an effort to build competitive advantage, a likely by-product of increased horizontal
and vertical competition within the industry and reflective of the increased role that suppliers
take in research and development. Figure 4.2 details the aggregate number of United States
patents awarded and U.S. patent applications in the area of automotive paints for the equipment
suppliers discussed in Section 1.5. The number of patent applications for 2007 was projected
based on the number as of March 15, 2007. In this figure, the number of patent applications is
fewer than the number of issued patents for two reasons: multiple patents can be issued from a
single application, and some of these issued patents arose from applications filed outside of the
U.S since many of these companies are headquartered elsewhere. This figure reveals a fairly
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steady increase in patents over the recent years, particularly when viewed over the long term.
For example, issued patents climbed by 45% in 2001-2006 compared to the previous five years.
During this time, total U.S. patent issuances climbed by less than 9%, indicating that automotive
paint shop equipment suppliers are seeking intellectual property protection at a rate far exceeding
that of general industry.
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Figure 4.2. Total number of U.S. patents issued and patent applications by
year, in the areas of automotive paints, for the equipment suppliers discussed
in Section 1.5.
As mentioned above, the increased focus on intellectual property is an understandable
outcome of the increasingly competitive automotive landscape described in Chapter 1, and firms
naturally will try to protect their innovations in an extremely capital-intensive and mature
industry. However, this dynamic potentially affects the collaborative relationships forged by
GPPC with suppliers. As described by von Hippel,47 many innovations may actually come from
end-users of products, and not from product manufacturers. For example, in semiconductor
equipment and scientific instruments - two areas that are at least broadly similar to automotive
manufacturing equipment- von Hippel observed that the majority of innovations came from end-
users and not from manufacturers. 48 The simple explanation for this phenomenon is that the end-
47 von Hippel, E. The Sources ofInnovation. Oxford University Press, New York (1988).
4 8 Ibid, p. 44.
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users were those most likely to benefit from their innovations, as they would be able to capture
the benefits in the form of higher profits.49
Extending von Hippel's theories to automotive vehicle coatings, GM employees likely
contribute valuable product innovations in vehicle coating equipment and processes. Indeed,
anecdotal information collected during this internship suggests that GPPC engineers (as well as
other GM employees) routinely make improvements in these areas, not unexpected given the
constant pressure to improve operations at plants. Suppliers' increased reliance on intellectual
property may therefore complicate collaborative innovation in the paint shops, particularly when
terms of joint development have not been clearly defined, as parties may focus on capturing
innovations rather than creating them. Also, suppliers' reliance on patent license fees to OEMs
may lead to double marginalization, eroding the cost competitiveness of all parties.
4.5 Closing the Loop: Life Cycle Cost and Incentives
To summarize the previous sections, some key observations emerge about the status of GPPC
within General Motors.
1. The GPPC's role involves recommendation of best practices in manufacturing plants,
but a single blueprint for all paint shops around the world does not currently exist due
to variations in capacity requirements and labor rates and the infrastructure in place
when the assets were acquired by GM.
2. GPPC operates in a highly collaborative fashion and must forge good working
relationships with suppliers, plant personnel, and the facilities group to be successful.
Often, the GPPC can only exert indirect control on these parties. In particular,
development and validation, two responsibilities of the GPPC, call upon these
relationships extensively.
3. There are sometimes competing metrics in the plant budgeting process, as investment
costs are emphasized by WFG and life cycle costs are emphasized by the GPPC.
4. Suppliers are increasingly relying on intellectual property to fend off horizontal and
vertical competition, at the possible cost of open collaboration with the GPPC.
4 9 Harhoff, D., Henkel, J., and von Hippel, E., "Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users Benefit
by Freely Revealing their Innovations," Research Policy 32 (2003) 1753.
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Given this situation, the following paragraphs provide some recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of the GPPC and creating mutually beneficial relationships for all stakeholders.
1. Adopt common metrics.
The first recommendation is to adopt a common set of metrics for project evaluation for all
parties (GPPC, WFG, plant management, suppliers, and GM management) based upon life cycle
cost minimization. There are many possible methods to link these metrics to incentives for each
group; one suggestion is to link all stakeholders' compensation to operating cost targets in the
plants. Admittedly, this is not a simple task, as all groups likely will have to rely on mutually
negotiated standards for cost projection to arrive at the most accurate projections of life cycle
cost. Additionally, incentives and rewards will depend on costs that may be incurred years from
now, possibly leading to "gaming" of the system over the long term in exchange for short-term
gains. However, this problem is not so different from the current incentive to postpone
investment in projects to maintain the appearance of cost control. Furthermore, this suggestion
could enable all groups to negotiate mutually agreeable standards for a project, avoid potential
conflict down the road by creating linked incentives, and streamline the decision-making process.
2. Consider hidden costs and strive to increase commonality.
In a related fashion, all parties should recognize the role of hidden costs in driving life cycle
cost, particularly experience effects and the cost of disruption. At this point, it is instructive to
examine the applicability of Intel's Copy Exactly! philosophy to automotive paint shops. To this
end, Terwiesch and Xu5 0 have developed a mathematical model describing process change
dynamics within manufacturing organizations, which enabled them to outline conditions in
which Copy Exactly! is an advantageous approach for manufacturing process transfer. Generally,
they determined that Copy Exactly! is best suited to processes with low initial levels of process
knowledge, where production ramps are conducted quickly, and where processes are extremely
sensitive to slight variations. This theoretical framework provides some insight into the
suitability of Copy Exactly! to the automotive industry. Compared to semiconductor
manufacturing, automotive process knowledge is high - there is no equivalent of Moore's Law
driving exponential advances in the automotive industry, so change tends to be evolutionary and
5 Terwiesch, C. and Xu, Y., "The Copy-Exactly Ramp-Up Strategy: Trading-Off Learning With Process Change,"
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 51 (2004) 71.
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the rate of process change is relatively low. For example, automotive manufacturing has not
changed radically over the past decade, while ten year old semiconductor processes are
essentially obsolete. However, the rate of process ramps is similar between the two industries; in
both cases, changeovers must be accomplished in weeks or months. Finally, the highly
integrated and complex nature of modem automotive design, coupled with a broad supply base,
means that manufacturing processes are relatively sensitive to variation, though of course not on
the atomic scale of semiconductors.
Given this theoretical framework, we can begin to see why GM's paint shops do not employ
a Copy Exactly! strategy. In fact, there are several reasons why it would be impractical to fully
shift to this approach. First, different labor rates throughout the world give rise to different
levels of automation, as plants need not rely as much on automation in regions where labor rates
are low. Second, different plants have different production capacities, which again call upon
different levels of automation and equipment types. Third, differences in product requirements
may call upon different coating processes, such as an added focus on anticorrosion coatings in
environments with long winters. Finally, unlike microelectronics plants (which face
obsolescence after only a few years), automotive manufacturing plants operate for decades, and
not every system can be cutting edge. In fact, in areas with low labor rates, vehicle
manufacturers routinely choose manufacturing processes with higher labor requirements, which
are also inherently more flexible. To accommodate these differences, rather than utilize a strict
Copy Exactly! methodology, GM employs a set of guidelines for process and facilities
requirements given the projected needs of the product to be served. The GPPC is actively
involved in creating and interpreting these guidelines.
However, while Copy Exactly! is not literally applicable to the paint shop, many of the main
lessons hold. OEMs and suppliers should pay careful attention to process changes and be sure to
consider the possible disruption cost that accompanies these changes. In short, no process
improvement is free. Furthermore, when the cost of disruption is explicitly part of life cycle cost
estimates, all parties recognize the true potential value of factory investments.
3. Effectively share risk between OEMs and suppliers.
The next set of recommendations involves the nature of supplier relationships. Here, OEMs
and suppliers share the same fate; not only are they financially interdependent, but continuous
innovation and process improvements rely on strong bonds between the parties. While this is a
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well-documented fact, the continued struggles between both parties suggest that while risk is
shared, it is not shared effectively.5 1
Zielke et al. point out two major categories of shared risk between OEMs and suppliers:
quality risk and volume risk. The former arises when the indirectly responsible OEM must
bear the cost of poor supplier quality, while the latter arises when the supplier must bear the risk
of reduced sales volume by the OEM. For purposes of this work, we can expand these
definitions to the paint shop by stating that OEMs endure quality risk when suppliers cannot
meet their cost targets without compromising on another design parameter, and suppliers endure
volume risk when poor business conditions at the OEM force current and future paint shop
investments to be scaled back and supplier's margins to shrink.
With these expanded definitions in place, the following suggestions, broadly following those
outlined by Zielke et al.,5 3 can help facilitate better supplier-OEM relationships in the paint shop.
First, both sides must credibly commit to each other's success. In particular, in exchange for
suppliers' contribution of process development resources, OEMs can commit to future business
with these suppliers to mitigate their volume risk. Also, as discussed above, linked incentives to
reduce operating costs in plants can help ensure that all parties make the correct long-term
decisions for GM, mitigating the OEM's quality risk. Finally, both sides should invest in open-
source innovations, through such mechanisms as industrial consortia or joint development
partnerships. This helps mitigate intellectual property risks on both side of the relationship.
Admittedly, many of these recommendations have been implemented in some form in the past;
the key to making them sustainable is to build long-term commitments from all parties at the
highest level.
51 Zielke, A., et al., "Race 2015: Refueling Automotive Companies' Economics." Germany, McKinsey & Company
(2005) p. 73.
52 Ibid.
5 Zielke, A., et al., "Race 2015: Refueling Automotive Companies' Economics." Germany, McKinsey & Company
(2005) p. 73-85.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Summary
A simple and flexible life cycle cost estimation tool has been developed for use in the Global
Paint and Polymers Center (GPPC) at General Motors. This tool enables users to build estimates
of life cycle cost over arbitrary time periods by entering separate line items into pre-defined user
forms. Powerful built-in sensitivity analysis tools allow users to test the sensitivity of life cycle
cost to fluctuations in inputs. Finally, the estimates of life cycle cost generated in this tool can
then be compared, using a separate analysis tool, to determine net present value, internal rate of
return, and payback of one project with respect to another. Taken together, these tools allow
engineers at the GPPC to quickly generate estimates for investment and operating costs for a
given project over its life.
While the cost estimation tool provides insight into investment and operating costs, separate
estimates of hidden costs must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this work, three classes
of hidden costs are defined - variation, disruption, and flexibility - and frameworks for
evaluating each of these classes are given. The cost of variation can be estimated using
statistical analysis on historical data that is analogous to the situation of interest. The cost of
disruption can be estimated by integrating experience curves over the time period of the
disruption. The cost or benefit of flexibility can be simulated using Monte Carlo techniques.
Taken together, these classes of cost can potentially represent a significant component of life
cycle cost and therefore must be considered when making projections.
Finally, this work has been placed in a broader context by considering the impact that
accurate cost estimation methods will have on the relationships between GPPC personnel and
other stakeholders in the cost estimation process. By considering life cycle cost over investment
cost, the needs of all stakeholders can be met and management can ensure that employees make
optimal decisions over the long term.
5.2 Suggestions for Future Work
The first set of suggestions for future work involves integration of the life cycle cost
estimation tool described in Chapter 2 with additional tools and models at General Motors. First,
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while the life cycle cost estimation tool developed in this work has limited ability to link process
parameters to cost (in particular, for material usage), a fully integrated process-based cost model
could be developed that uses mathematical and logical relations to link inputs to cost. For
example, instead of manually entering in required process equipment based on projected capacity,
an integrated model would have logic that describes the equipment necessary for a given
capacity, and seamlessly switch between different configurations as capacity is varied. That is,
in its current state, the tool cannot automatically vary the assumptions that describe the changes
in equipment requirements that accompany changes in capacity - the user must build separate
scenarios to describe this behavior. A fully integrated tool would thus help the user make the
correct choices in input and allow more accurate sensitivity analysis when inputs are varied over
a wide range. This integration could follow the guidelines set forth in the bill of engineering
(BOE) and bill of process (BOP) developed for paint facilities at General Motors. Further up the
chain, the output of the cost estimation tool could also be integrated seamlessly into the
streamlined project proposals viewed by upper management, which compare project cost to
future revenue streams. Currently, the output is rather detailed, and automatically user-friendly
graphs and tables could cut down on the time required to package the model output.
Regarding hidden costs, recommended future work centers on analysis of historical data.
General Motors has a wealth of manufacturing data, at all levels of detail, which could be used to
generate more examples of hidden cost at General Motors. In the best case, these examples
could then be used to generate simple decision rules, equations, or models that would enable
end-users to quickly estimate the magnitude of hidden costs. For example, the cost of disruption
could be estimated with a simple questionnaire that links the type of disruption event (e.g. new
part, system, or plant) to the likely effect on output and cost of disruption typically associated
with that event.
Finally, this work could be expanded by considering the possible impact of long-term future
trends - e.g. technological developments, changes in the competitive landscape, or new
regulations - on the decisions that one would make when choosing between various scenarios.
Many of the decisions made during the paint shops design phase are not easily reversed, as the
facilities are built to operate over several decades and are very costly to alter. However, large-
scale changes in the outside world during that time could drastically alter the recommendations
provided by a cost model. For example, carbon dioxide emissions may be capped at some point
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in the future, with emissions credits available for trade on the free market. This would
dramatically alter the economics of carbon emissions and place a high value on energy
conservation, despite the likely higher initial investment required. Additionally, abrupt changes
in the marketplace, such as shifts in consumer demand or introduction of disruptive technologies,
would vastly devalue inflexible plants incapable of responding to these shifts. In short, while life
cycle cost estimates provide valuable guidance to managers, they must be used to supplement a
comprehensive long-term strategy and vision regarding the future of automotive manufacturing.
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Appendix A: Implementing Monte Carlo Analysis
The following four steps describes the basic implementation of Monte Carlo Analysis in a
spreadsheet program such as Microsoft Excel.
1. Choose a statistical distribution over which to vary the input. The three most common
distributions are the uniform distribution, triangular distribution, and normal distribution.
The shapes of these distributions and relevant statistical parameters required for Monte Carlo
simulation using these distributions are shown in Appendix Figure 1 below.
2. Generate a uniformly distributed random variable (RV) on the range [0,1]. This can be done
using the RAND function in Microsoft Excel.
3. Transform this random variable to a random input (RI) for the simulation. In this step, the
uniformly distributed random variable on [0,1] is converted to a randomly distributed input
according to the distribution of choice.
a. For a uniform distribution, the relation between the RV and RI is:
RI = Minimum + RV x (Maximum - Minimum)
b. For a triangular distribution, the relation is given by:
If RV (Peak - Minimum) / Maximum - Minimum Then
RI = Minimum + [RV x (Peak- Minimum) x (Maximum - Minimum)]0 5
If RV (Peak - Minimum) / Maximum - Minimum then
RI = Maximum - [(1-RV) x (Maximum - Peak) x (Maximum - Minimum)] 0 *5
c. Finally, for a normal distribution, the random input is the inverse of the cumulative
normal distribution curve, for the given mean and standard deviation, that yields the
random variable. In Microsoft Excel, this calculation is accomplished with the
NORMINV function.
4. Calculate the resulting output.
The results of Monte Carlo analysis are usually recorded as a histogram of output values,
such as cost. The shape of the histogram is determined by the statistical distributions that
defined the inputs and the mathematical relations between inputs and output.
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Appendix Figure 1. Common statistical distributions used
analysis.
in Monte Carlo
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Distribution Uniform Triangular Normal
Shape of
ProbabilityDensity Function
Parameters Minimum, Minimum, Peak, Mean, Standard
Maximum Maximum Deviation
Appendix B: Screenshots of Life Cycle Cost Estimator
In the following section, the life cycle cost estimator interface is described and several
screenshots are presented through generation of life cycle costs for a purely hypothetical scenario.
In this scenario, we seek to estimate the twenty-year life cycle cost for system described in the
table below, operating at a volume of 250,000 vehicles per year (divided into 50 jobs per hour
processed over 5000 hours in each year).
Appendix Table 1.
Robots
Paint Booth
Building Space
Utilities
Investment
Investment
nstrnent
Investment
Description of hypothetical system to be modeled in this
appendix.
Two robots at $250,000 each, 10 year replacement cycle
5 Nt o y $yent cycle
100 feet of booth at $600/foot, twenty year replacement cycle
Floor space and overhead to handle 50 ft. wide booth at $100 per
square foot
Operating $5/job
Miscellaneous Operating $100,000 per year to cover maintenance material and labor costs
When generating cost estimates, the first step is to define basic inputs, as shown in Appendix
Figure 2 below.
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Appendix Figure 2. Basic inputs for the system being modeled in this
appendix.
Next, the user must input each line item into the menu shown in Appendix Figure 3 below.
The fields on this menu automatically update to fit the class of cost (operating or investment),
and most fields are checked to ensure that they fall within reasonable limits, which helps ensure
that users cannot make simple mistakes that compromise the model (such as depreciating labor
costs). As described in Chapter 2, each instance of investment must be entered separately to
enable depreciation; thus, each equipment replacement occurrence is entered as a separate line
item in this model. For investment costs, the initial cost is assumed to be incurred in the years
given in the table above, while depreciation begins one year later. All investments were
depreciated over a ten year straight line schedule; actual schedules used by General Motors vary.
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Appendix Figure 3. Sample input screen for a line item, with the inputs for
labor defined according to the system described in this appendix.
In the next step, the user compiles life cycle costs and arrives at the output shown in
Appendix Figure 4 (only the first three years are shown). During this step, each line item input
above is annualized and annual depreciation costs are calculated. These annual costs are then
converted to net cash flows and summed to yield life cycle cost.
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Lifecycle Cost
$17,990.775.71 _
Item Costs by Year o 1 2 3
HVAC Equipment $500,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Paint Booth $60,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Conveyors. Fourteen Year Relacement $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Convegors, Seven Year Replacement $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Conveyors $10,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Robots, 10 Year Replacement $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Robots $500,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Operators $0.00 $500,000.00 $500,000.00 $500,000.00
Paint Material $0.00 $2,500,000.00 $2,500,000.00 $2,500,000.00
Utilities $0.00 $1,250,000.00 $1,250,000.00 $1.250,000.00
Miscellaneous $0.00 $100,000.00 $100,000.00 $100,000.00
Depredation Costs by Year a 1 2 3
HVAC Equipment $0.00 $50,000.00 $50,000.00 $50,000.00
Paint Booth $0.00 $6,000.00 $6,000.00 $6,000.00
Conveyors, Fourteen Year Relacement $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Conveyors, Seven Year Replacement $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Conveyors $0.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00
Robots, 10 Year Replacement $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Robots $0.00 $50,000.00 $50,000.00 $50,000.00
Undiscounted Net Cost a 1 2 3
Investment $1,070,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Operating $0.00 $4,350,000.00 $4.350,000.00 $4,350,000.00
Depreciation $0.00 $107,000.00 $107,000.00 $107,000.00
Net Cost $1,070,000.00 $2,678,625.00 $2,678,625.00 $2,678,625.00
Discounted Net Cost o 1 2 3
Investment $1,070,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Operating $0.00 $3,782,608.70 $3,289,224.95 $2,860,195.61
Depreciation $0.00 $93,043.48 $80,907.37 $70,354.24
Net Cost $1,070,000.00 $2,329,239.13 $2,025,425.33 $1,761,239.42
Appendix Figure 4. Sample life cycle cost output for the system described in
this appendix. Because of formatting constraints, only the first three years
are given.
Finally, the user can perform sensitivity analysis. Two different routines are described below.
First, the input leverage routine allows the user to quickly determine which inputs drive life cycle
cost, enabling quick determination of where cost cuts may be most effective and where slight
errors in projections can have the largest impact on life cycle cost. A sample input leverage table
is given below. Paint material and utility costs have the highest leverage, indicating that they
dominate life cycle cost. On the other hand, investment costs do not exhibit high input leverage,
since they are depreciated over ten years and their replacement costs are incurred far in the future.
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Input Leverage
Paint Material 0.54362%
Utilities 0.27181%
Operators 0.10872%
HVAC Equipment 0.02256%
Robots 0.02256%
Miscellaneous 0.02174%
Robots. 10 Year Replacement 0.00558%
Paint Booth 0.00271%
Conveyors 0.00045%
Conveyors, Seven Year Replacement 0.00017%
Conveyors, Fourteen Year Relacement 0.00007%
Appendix Figure 5. Input leverage for the system described in this appendix,
showing that paint material and utility costs are the most significant drivers
of life cycle cost.
Second, the user can perform Monte Carlo analysis. In this example, the annual inflation rate of
energy costs is varied from -2% to 10% according to a triangular distribution (with peak value of
0%) and conveyor and robot replacement frequencies are uniformly varied one year from their
nominal values. Life cycle cost is then determined from 10,000 trials using these assumptions.
The resulting histogram is shown below. Because utility costs exhibit high leverage, this shape
of the histogram is largely determined by the triangular shape of the utility cost variation
assumed in this analysis.
86
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0 % I j I I I I I I I 1 1 , 1 j 1
LO) Cn 14 0 cO (D N C O 0 N o c0
Lei re- C tO 0 e 04 N- Cr) M ) n- th
c i ye dscibe 6 6 6 Th c ci 6 re Nf & r cs
N %) 0 o e d r 0t Ce I 0 Nt f cC LO N M114 CO) CO Cf) CO 04 N N T- Ir r CD 0 0D M
-i 7c6 L & cli C6 & c'i CS K- Ni & c6 vi &1-
CD0 C r - MO V) CD CO 0 N4 CO) LO) - CO 0 N4
LO) M) N LO) 00 V- V* CO T- Vt 1,- 0 Cf) N- 0)
r- r - Vr V r r- N N4 0 N N4 N N N4
6r#. ta 61 9 9> (9* V9* 6k 6A. V* 6A 61.>
Lifecycle Cost
Appendix Figure 6. Histogram that results from Monte Carlo analysis on the
system described in this appendix. The annual inflation rate of energy costs
is varied according to a triangular distribution from -2% to 10% (with peak
value of 0%) and conveyor and robot replacement frequencies are uniformly
varied plus or minus one year from their nominal values.
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